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Abstract
Class action litigation seeks to mediate pressing conflicts between individual au-
tonomy and collective justice; federal supervision and local control; self-interested
class counsel and the represented class. These conflicts are exacerbated when a
federal court that approves a class action settlement later seeks to enjoin state
court litigants from violating its terms. Yet the demand for such injunctions has
increased in light of the advent of back-end opt-out rights. In recent years, class
members have been afforded “back-end,” or delayed, opportunities to opt out of a
class action once the terms of the settlement are disclosed. These back-end opt-
out rights may afford only limited rights to sue outside the confines of the class
action – for example, class members may be permitted to seek compensatory but
not punitive damages. Does the federal court that approved the settlement have
authority to enjoin back-end opt-out plaintiffs from seeking relief in state court
that exceeds the limits built into the back-end opt-out right?
Three sets of curious complications may arise if the federal court seeks to en-
ter such an injunction. First, if diversity is lacking between the opt-out plaintiff
and the defendant, and the plaintiff sues on only state-law claims, the federal court
may lack subject matter jurisdiction to grant an injunction. It also may lack per-
sonal jurisdiction over an opt-out plaintiff who has no contacts with the state in
which the federal court sits. Second, federalism complications are likely to crop
up. Both the Anti-Injunction Act and the Younger abstention doctrine limit the au-
thority of federal courts to issue injunctions against pending state court proceed-
ings. Finally, equitable and practical considerations may counsel against micro-
management of state court litigation by a federal judge.
The objective in identifying these complications is not to question the wisdom
of back-end opt-out rights, but rather to encourage their use by suggesting a vari-
ety of steps that courts and counsel can take to enforce the limits built into back-
end opt-out rights without unnecessarily intruding upon the prerogatives of state
court judges, exposing back-end opt-out plaintiffs to onerous litigation in for a
with which they have no contact, or rendering their preserved rights meaning-
less. Among other recommendations, the article urges federal and state courts to
collaborate in the enforcement of back-end opt-out rights.
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ABSTRACT
In recent years, class members have been afforded delayed, or
“back-end,” opportunities to opt out of a class action once the terms
of the settlement are disclosed. These back-end opt-out rights may
afford only limited rights to sue outside the confines of the class
action. For example, opt-out plaintiffs may be permitted to seek
compensatory, but not punitive damages. Does the federal court that
approved the settlement have authority to enjoin back-end opt-out
plaintiffs from seeking relief in state court that exceeds the limits
built into the back-end opt-out right?
Three sets of curious complications may arise if the federal court
seeks to enter such an injunction. First, if diversity is lacking
between the opt-out plaintiff and the defendant, and the plaintiff
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sues on only state law claims, the federal court may lack subject
matter jurisdiction to grant an injunction. The federal court may
also lack personal jurisdiction over an opt-out plaintiff who has no
contacts with the state in which the federal court sits. Second,
federalism complications are likely to crop up. Both the Anti-
Injunction Act and the Younger abstention doctrine limit the
authority of federal courts to issue injunctions against pending state
court proceedings. Finally, equitable and practical considerations
may counsel against micromanagement of state court litigation by
a federal judge.
The objective in identifying these complications is not to question
the wisdom of back-end opt-out rights, but rather to facilitate their
use. This Article suggests a variety of steps that courts and counsel
can take to enforce the limits built into back-end opt-out rights
without unnecessarily intruding upon the prerogatives of state court
judges, exposing back-end opt-out plaintiffs to onerous litigation in
fora with which they have no contacts, or rendering their preserved
rights meaningless. Among other recommendations, this Article
urges federal and state courts to collaborate in the enforcement of
back-end opt-out rights.
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1. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (requiring commonality, typicality, and adequate
representation); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (affording members of class actions certified under
Rule 23(b)(3) an opportunity to opt out); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1) (requiring judicial oversight
of settlement fairness); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(B) (obligating class counsel to “fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the class”); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(2)(B) (requiring the
court to choose as class counsel the applicant “best able to represent the interests of the
class”); see also Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-
1(a)(3)(B)(i), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) (2000) (requiring the court to appoint as lead plaintiff the class
member “most capable of adequately representing the interests of class members”).
2. See, e.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 490-93 (2000); Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving
on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 529, 598-99 (1978); John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large
Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 927-31 (1987) [hereinafter Coffee, Entrepreneurial
Litigation]; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in
Shareholder Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5, 46-48, 65-69
[hereinafter Coffee, Unfaithful Champion]; Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market
Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate
Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2127-30 (2000).
3. See, e.g., Coffee, Unfaithful Champion, supra note 2, at 71; Deborah L. Rhode, Class
Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1251 (1982). But see Evans v. Jeff D., 475
U.S. 717, 738 n.30 (1986) (“The Court is unanimous in concluding that the Fees Act should
not be interpreted to prohibit all simultaneous negotiations of a defendant’s liability on the
merits and his liability for his opponent’s attorney’s fees.”); Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 6-7
(1985) (“If defendants are not allowed to make lump-sum offers that would, if accepted,
represent their total liability, they would understandably be reluctant to make settlement
offers.”).
INTRODUCTION
Much ink has been spilt critiquing the class action vehicle and
exploring creative means to ensure that the named representative,
class counsel, the court, and even the defendant protect the
interests of absent class members. Although the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure contain numerous requirements designed to achieve
this objective,1 these protections often prove inadequate or illusory.
Commentators have recommended a host of reforms to bring the
interests of class counsel into closer alignment with the interests of
the class and to address other problems endemic to aggregate
litigation. Among other things, scholars have recommended
changing the method by which class counsel and counsel represent-
ing class members who opt out are compensated;2 barring the
simultaneous negotiation of a settlement of the merits and a fee
award;3 auctioning off the class claim to the highest bidder, thereby
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art56
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4. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 105-18 (1991) [hereinafter Macey & Miller, Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role];
Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 543-46 (1996); cf. Jill
E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 652 (2002) (identifying problems with the auction model and
proposing the lead counsel model as an alternative); Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen,
Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A Critical Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 423,
424-26 (1993) (identifying the costs of an auction model).
5. See Mary Kay Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the Class Action
Lawyer, 66 TEX. L. REV. 385, 404-09 (1987) (encouraging more informal cooperation between
the courts and class action lawyers).
6. See Debra Lyn Bassett, The Defendant’s Obligation to Ensure Adequate
Representation in Class Actions, 74 UMKC L. REV. 511, 521-22, 530-40 (2006).
7. See HENSLER, supra note 2, at 486-90, 493-97; William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness
Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1435, 1475-81 (2006).
8. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Rethinking Certification and Notice in Opt-Out Class
Actions, 74 UMKC L. REV. 637, 646-49 (2006); George Rutherglen, Better Late Than Never:
Notice and Opt Out at the Settlement Stage of Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 258, 260, 270-
71, 281, 293 (1996); Mark C. Weber, A Consent-Based Approach to Class Action Settlement:
Improving Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1155, 1158 (1998).
9. See Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in Class
Actions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 439, 490 n.109 (1996).
10. See, e.g., Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 2, at 925; Roger C. Cramton,
Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and “Settlement Class Actions”: An Introduction, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 811, 836 (1995); Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist
Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 941, 967 (1995).
uniting ownership and control of the suit;4 developing a more
collaborative or consultative relationship between the trial judge
and class counsel;5 emphasizing the defendant’s obligation to ensure
that absent class members are adequately represented;6 and
requiring greater judicial scrutiny of the settlement and taking
other steps to ensure that the fairness hearing provides a meaning-
ful constraint on class counsel.7
To ensure that absent class members can make an informed
decision about whether to participate in a class action or to opt out
and sue separately, scholars have advocated that class members be
afforded a delayed opportunity to opt out. In particular, commenta-
tors have suggested that absent class members should have an
opportunity to opt out when they learn of the details of the proposed
settlement,8 when they hear objectors’ challenges to the terms of the
settlement,9 or when they see the judicially-crafted distribution
plan and can determine how much they will actually recover.10
Expressing concern for future claimants who may not even know
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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11. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1448-53, 1465 (1995) [hereinafter Coffee, Class Wars]; Cramton,
supra note 10, at 835-36; Schuck, supra note 10, at 967. Even advocates of back-end opt-out
rights recognize that opting out is not a perfect solution. See Coffee, Entrepreneurial
Litigation, supra note 2, at 930 (noting that opt-outs result in duplicative litigation and
expose the client to attorney opportunism). Critics of the back-end opt-out right question its
necessity and utility, while highlighting its costs. See David Rosenberg, Adding a Second
Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: Cost Without Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 67-69.
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3). The Advisory Committee Notes to the 2003 amendments
acknowledge that, in settlement class actions, class members will not have received an
earlier opportunity to opt out. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3) advisory committee’s notes. The most
recent discussion draft of the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate
Litigation would go further than Rule 23(e)(3) and provide:
In any class action in which the terms of a settlement are not revealed until
after the initial period for opting out has expired, class members should
ordinarily have the right to opt out after the dissemination of notice of the
proposed settlement. If the court chooses not to grant a second opt-out right, it
must make a written finding that compelling reasons exist for refusing to grant
a second opt-out.
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.11 (Discussion Draft No. 2, 2007). The Civil
Rules Advisory Committee considered and rejected a presumptively available second
opportunity to opt out. DAVID F. LEVI, ADVISORY COMM. ON THE FED. RULES OF CIVIL PROC.,
REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE 11-13 (2001), http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/comment2002/8-01CV.pdf.
13. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3) advisory committee’s notes.
14. Id.
they have been injured until after the initial opt-out period has
expired, some commentators have suggested that absent class
members should have an opportunity to opt out after they learn of
the existence or the extent of their injuries.11
In 2003, the Supreme Court adopted a modest delayed opt-out
reform by amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to provide
district courts with explicit authority to decline to approve a
settlement “unless it affords a new opportunity to request exclusion
to individual class members who had an earlier opportunity to
request exclusion but did not do so.”12 Among the factors a district
court may consider in exercising its discretion are “changes in the
information available to class members since expiration of the first
opportunity to request exclusion .”13 The Advisory Committee Notes
acknowledge that if initial class certification and settlement of the
case occur proximately in time, the court may order simultaneous
notice of certification and settlement, which “avoids the cost and
potential confusion of providing two notices and makes the single
notice more meaningful.”14 Nevertheless, the Rule recognizes the
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art56
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15. Id. (“A decision to remain in the class is likely to be more carefully considered and is
better informed when settlement terms are known.”).
16. Id.
17. See infra notes 52, 56-57, 61-62 and accompanying text (describing the limitations
imposed on those exercising downstream opt-out rights in the fen-phen litigation).
18. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text; see also DAVID F. LEVI, ADVISORY COMM.
ON THE FED. RULES OF CIVIL PROC., REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE 129,
186-98 (2002), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc09-2002/CVRulesJC.pdf (summarizing
comments received on a proposed presumptively available second opportunity to opt out).
potential need for a second opportunity to opt out if the initial opt-
out right was afforded before the terms of the settlement were
known.15 The Advisory Committee Notes implicitly encourage the
parties to include a delayed opt-out right in the settlement agree-
ment itself: “An agreement by the parties themselves to permit
class members to elect exclusion at this point by the settlement
agreement may be one factor supporting approval of the settle-
ment.”16
When settlement agreements provide for delayed opt-out rights,
sometimes referred to as “downstream” or “back-end” opt-out rights,
they may deny absent class members the same unlimited opportu-
nity to sue the defendant that the class members would have had
if they had opted out at the time of initial certification. Instead,
absent class members exercising back-end opt-out rights may be
permitted to sue the defendant in tort, but not for punitive dam-
ages; to sue for only certain conditions; or to seek binding arbitra-
tion without the opportunity to litigate in court.17
Although commentators have debated the extent to which back-
end opt-out rights protect absent class members,18 few have
discussed how the limitations built into back-end opt-out rights
should be enforced, leaving many unanswered questions. For
example, if a federal court approves a class action settlement, but
a state court entertains the independent action filed by the opt-out
plaintiff, which court determines the scope of the restrictions on the
right to sue? Which court determines whether evidence that the
plaintiff seeks to offer, purportedly in support of a permissible
claim, may be excluded because it also supports a claim barred by
the settlement agreement? Stated more generally, which court has
authority to enforce the limits inherent in the back-end opt-out
right?
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19. See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1431 (2d Cir. 1993).
20. See infra Part IV.B.
21. See infra Part IV.C.
Although the class action court that approved the settlement may
view itself as best equipped to interpret the terms of the settlement
agreement and the restrictions on the opt-out right,19 three sets of
curious complications may arise if the class action court attempts
to regulate the subsequently filed state court action by enjoining the
back-end opt-out plaintiff from proceeding with her state court suit.
First, if diversity is lacking between the opt-out plaintiff and the
defendant, and if the plaintiff sues on only state law claims, the
federal court may lack subject matter jurisdiction to grant an
injunction. The federal court may also lack personal jurisdiction
over a back-end opt-out plaintiff who has no contacts with the state
in which the federal court sits. Second, even if the federal court
has jurisdiction  to  proceed, federalism complications are likely to
arise. Both the Anti-Injunction Act20 and the Younger abstention
doctrine21 limit the authority of federal courts to issue injunctions
against pending state court proceedings. Finally, equitable and
practical considerations may counsel against micromanagement of
state court litigation by a federal judge.
The objective in identifying these complications is not to question
the wisdom of back-end opt-out rights, but rather to facilitate their
use by suggesting a variety of steps that courts and counsel can
take to enforce the limits built into back-end opt-out rights without
unnecessarily intruding upon the prerogatives of state court judges,
exposing back-end opt-out plaintiffs to onerous litigation in fora
with which they have no contact, or rendering their preserved
rights meaningless.
Parts I and II of this Article provide the backdrop for a meaning-
ful discussion of these complications. Part I identifies four different
circumstances in which back-end opt-out rights have been granted.
Part I demonstrates that, in some cases, downstream opt-out rights
are granted to provide absent class members with full information
about the settlement and a meaningful opportunity to decide
whether they are better off remaining in the class or suing inde-
pendently. In other cases, back-end opt-out rights are granted to
permit class members to rethink their options if circumstances
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art56
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change after final approval of the settlement. For example, changes
in class members’ medical conditions or a shortfall in the fund set
aside to pay their claims may alter class members’ calculus about
the benefits of class membership.
To illustrate the types of complications that bedevil back-end opt-
out rights, Part II describes a massive class action lawsuit filed on
behalf of millions of users of the diet drugs known as fen-phen,
which were found to cause heart problems. Class members were
afforded downstream opt-out rights if they first learned of their
heart problems after the expiration of the initial opt-out period, if
their medical condition worsened, or if the fund set aside to
compensate them proved inadequate. Absent class members who
exercised these downstream opt-out rights were permitted to sue
the drug manufacturer in tort but were not permitted to seek
punitive damages. When opt-out plaintiffs filed their individual
suits and sought to introduce evidence of the defendant’s willful and
wanton conduct (which would have supported both preserved claims
for negligence and barred claims for punitive damages), the
defendant returned to the federal court that had overseen the class
action and asked that court to enforce the limits built into the back-
end opt-out rights. It was in this context that numerous curious
complications arose.
With the fen-phen litigation providing a vivid illustration, this
Article proceeds to analyze three different kinds of complications.
Part III addresses jurisdictional complications and demonstrates
that federal courts entertaining class actions can take simple steps
to ensure that they will have ancillary subject matter jurisdiction
to enforce the limits built into back-end opt-out rights. Part III then
grapples with the more intractable personal jurisdiction problems
that arise if a federal court seeks to enjoin back-end opt-out
plaintiffs who lack minimum contacts with the state. Part III teases
apart questions of consent, fairness, the right to collaterally attack
a class action judgment for inadequate representation, and the
jurisdictional reach of federal courts under the Fifth Amendment.
Part III ultimately concludes that cases may exist in which the
burden of appearing before the federal class action court to oppose
a request for injunctive relief or to challenge the adequacy of
representation would be so great, or an assertion of jurisdiction
would otherwise be so unreasonable, that the court’s exercise of
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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22. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000); see infra Part IV.B.
23. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); see infra Part IV.C.
24. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
jurisdiction would violate the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause. Part III also considers steps that the class action court may
take to avoid this potential jurisdictional problem.
Part IV analyzes the federalism complications raised by both the
Anti-Injunction Act22 and the Younger abstention doctrine.23 In the
context of this discussion, this Article demonstrates that although
the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)24 alters the federalism
landscape, it fails to strengthen the case for federal injunctions
against back-end opt-out plaintiffs. In discussing the statutory
exceptions to the ban on anti-suit injunctions, Part IV reveals both
the overbroad and underinclusive nature of the court’s authority to
enjoin state litigation and identifies proactive steps that the parties
and the class action court can take to ensure that a federal
injunction does not render meaningless the rights retained by back-
end opt-out plaintiffs.
Finally, Part V addresses the equitable and practical complica-
tions that may arise when federal courts seek to micromanage
litigation pending in state court. Part V demonstrates how an
unduly broad or vague federal order may paralyze the state court
from entertaining a back-end opt-out plaintiff’s claim, disrupt the
smooth flow of the state court trial, or render the back-end opt-out
plaintiff’s attorney overly cautious in the representation of her
client out of fear of violating the federal injunction. Part V then
suggests a variety of measures that the parties and both the federal
and state courts can take to minimize federal interference with
pending state court proceedings and to protect the rights preserved
by back-end opt-out plaintiffs while ensuring that the limitations
built into back-end opt-out rights are enforced. This Article
concludes by summarizing its recommendations and urging federal
and state courts to collaborate in the enforcement of back-end opt-
out rights.
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25. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 743-45 (4th Cir. 1989); Thomas v.
Christopher, 169 F.R.D. 224, 235, 244-45 (D.D.C. 1996), rev’d in part sub nom. Thomas v.
Albright, 139 F.3d 227, 233-37 (D.C. Cir. 1998). But see In re Visa Check/Mastermoney
Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503, 518 n.18 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d sub nom. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2005).
26. In re A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d at 743-44.
27. Id. For a discussion of In re A.H. Robins and the trustees’ efforts to limit the number
of claimants who chose to litigate, see Georgene Vairo, Mass Tort Bankruptcies: The Who,
the Why and the How, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 93, 111-21 (2004).
28. See Nilsen v. York County, 382 F. Supp. 2d 206, 221 n.9 (D. Me. 2005). But see
Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 271 (2d Cir. 2006).
29. See Nilsen, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 206.
30. Id. at 221 n.9 (citations omitted).
I. TYPOLOGY OF BACK-END OPT-OUT RIGHTS
Absent class members have been afforded back-end opt-out rights
in at least four different circumstances. First, class members have
been afforded an opportunity to opt out once they learned the terms
of the settlement or the amount they would recover.25 For example,
in the Dalkon Shield litigation, the Fourth Circuit approved a
settlement that contemplated creation of a claims resolution
facility.26 Class members would submit their claims to the facility,
which would make an offer of settlement. If a class member
declined to accept the settlement offer, she would be afforded “the
option of deciding her claim by arbitration or by a jury trial at her
option.”27
Second, some courts have permitted class members to opt out if
the terms of the settlement changed after expiration of the initial
opt-out right.28 For example, a class action was filed on behalf of
county jail inmates who challenged the practice of routine strip
searches without individualized suspicion.29 The original settlement
would have provided female inmates with twice as much money as
male inmates. The court found that term of the settlement to be
unconstitutional. The court concluded its opinion by stating that
if the parties sought to amend the settlement to address this
concern, the court “would require a new opportunity for female class
members who have filed claims to opt out ... [b]ecause they ... would
be negatively affected by such an amendment.”30 These first two
types of back-end opt-out rights are designed to provide absent class
members with full information about the final settlement and a
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31. See, e.g., In re Serzone, 231 F.R.D. 221, 229-30 (S.D. W. Va. 2005); In re Silicone Gel
Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-10000-S, 1994 WL 578353, at *7 (N.D. Ala.
Sept. 1, 1994).
32. See In re Serzone, 231 F.R.D. at 230.
33. See id.
34. See, e.g., Nationwide Class Action Settlement Agreement with American Home
Products Corp. §§ II.C, IV.D.3, In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 18, 1999), available at http://www.fen-phen-eresource.com/settlementagreement.cfm
[hereinafter Settlement Agreement]; Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 150, 166, 169-70
(S.D. Ohio 1992).
35. Bowling, 143 F.R.D. at 150, 166, 169-70.
meaningful opportunity to decide whether they are better off
remaining in the class or suing independently.
The third type of back-end opt-out right assures class members
an opportunity to exclude themselves from the class in the event
that the fund established by the settlement agreement for the
payment of claims proves inadequate to satisfy all of the claims
presented,31 or if actual awards are lower than the amounts
promised in the original settlement agreement.32 For example, in a
class action filed on behalf of patients treated with an antidepres-
sant medication that allegedly caused liver damage, the settlement
agreement afforded class members who suffered from specified
hepatic injuries an opportunity to opt out if the fund created to pay
their claims ran short due to an unexpectedly high number of
qualifying claimants or claims.33 This third type of back-end opt-out
right takes into account ex post changes that may alter the class
members’ initial calculus about the benefits of class membership.
Finally, class members have been afforded the opportunity to opt
out and sue defendants in tort if they developed or discovered
medical problems after the expiration of the original opt-out period,
or if their conditions worsened.34 For instance, in a class action
brought on behalf of patients whose artificial heart valves allegedly
had a tendency to fracture, the settlement agreement afforded class
members the opportunity to sue the manufacturer in tort in the
event of a post-settlement heart valve fracture.35 Like the third type
of back-end opt-out right, the fourth type contemplates a material
ex post change, not in the resources available to compensate class
members, but rather in the class members’ own medical condition.
Class members in the fen-phen litigation were also afforded
several opportunities to opt out after the initial opt-out period
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36. In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig. (Diet Drugs I), 282 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2002).
For a thorough account of the facts giving rise to the fen-phen litigation and the terms of the
Settlement Agreement, see the memorandum of the district court written in support of its
final certification order and the order approving the settlement. Memorandum and Pretrial
Order No. 1415, at **1-33, In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593, 2000 WL
1222042 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000), aff’d, 275 F.3d 34 (unpublished table decision) (3d Cir.
2001) [hereinafter Memorandum]. For later developments and a critical assessment of the
lawyers representing some of the absent class members who submitted claims for payment
and the doctors who supported their claims, see Alison Frankel, Still Ticking: Mistaken
Assumptions, Greedy Lawyers, and Suggestions of Fraud Have Made Fen-Phen a Disaster of
a Mass Tort, AM. LAW., Mar. 2005, at 92-97, 99, 133. For the argument that the fen-phen
settlement “confers upon class members what closely resembles a put option,” and a
discussion of “how the fen-phen settlement stands as the starting point for an option-based
model that may bridge the usual conflict between autonomy and peace,” see Richard A.
Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 747, 756, 759, 796-822 (2002) (footnote omitted).
37. Food & Drug Admin., Public Health Advisory, Reports of Valvular Heart Disease in
Patients Receiving Concomitant Fenfluramine and Phentermine (July 8, 1997),
http://www.fda.gov/cder/news/phen/phenfen.htm.
38. See Diet Drugs I, 282 F.3d at 225; Memorandum, supra note 36, at *2.
39. The manufacturer of the drugs, American Home Products Corporation, changed its
name to Wyeth in March 2002. In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig. (Diet Drugs II), 369 F.3d
293, 298 n.1 (3d Cir. 2004).
expired. Part II of this Article examines the fen-phen litigation in
detail to illustrate some of the curious complications that may arise
with back-end opt-out rights.
II. AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE COMPLICATIONS: THE FEN-PHEN
LITIGATION
A. The Underlying Facts
The fen-phen litigation involved a combination of prescription
diet drugs, referred to as fen-phen, which millions of people took
between 1995 and 1997.36 In July 1997, after the Mayo Clinic
announced a finding of valvular heart disease (VHD) among fen-
phen users, the federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued
a Public Health Advisory regarding the drugs.37 When additional
cases of VHD among fen-phen users became known, the FDA
requested the withdrawal of the drugs from the United States
market and the manufacturers complied.38
Approximately 18,000 lawsuits and over one hundred putative
class actions were filed against Wyeth,39 the manufacturer of two of
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40. In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig. (Diet Drugs III), 385 F.3d 386, 389 (3d Cir. 2004);
Diet Drugs I, 282 F.3d at 225.
41. See Diet Drugs I, 282 F.3d at 225.
42. See id. The class comprised five subclasses. See Settlement Agreement, supra note
34, §§ II.B, II.C. The district court has approved numerous amendments to the Settlement
Agreement. See FenPhen1203.com, The Official MDL-1203 Web Site, http://www.fenphen
1203.com/index.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
43. Diet Drugs I, 282 F.3d at 225; see also Settlement Agreement, supra note 34, §§ IV.A,
IV.B.
44. Pretrial Order No. 997 Conditionally Certifying Settlement Class, Preliminarily
Approving the Settlement Agreement, Approving the Forms of Notice, and Scheduling the
Fairness Hearing, In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 1999),
available at http://www.fenphen1203.com/748448.html [hereinafter Preliminary Order]; see
the diet drugs involved: fenfluramine, which had been marketed
under the brand name Pondimin, and dexfenfluramine, which had
been marketed under the brand name Redux.40 Wyeth removed
many of the cases filed against it in state court to federal court.
In December 1997, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
(JPMDL) transferred all of the federal actions to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for coordi-
nated and consolidated pretrial proceedings before Judge Louis
Bechtle.41
B. The Terms of the Settlement: Four Opt-out Rights
In April 1999, following extensive discovery, Wyeth entered into
global settlement negotiations with the plaintiffs in the federal
multidistrict litigation and some of the plaintiffs in the state class
actions. The parties reached a tentative settlement in November
1999, which contemplated a nationwide class of all persons in the
United States who had ingested either or both of the diet drugs, as
well as their representatives and dependents.42 The settlement
contemplated a variety of forms of relief, including reimbursement
of the purchase price of the drugs, reimbursement of the cost of an
echocardiogram, medical screening, medical care or cash payments
in lieu of care, compensation for injuries, and the creation of a
medical research and education fund.43
In November 1999, the district court entered an order condition-
ally certifying the nationwide settlement class in accordance with
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3), and gave
preliminary approval of the settlement.44 The order afforded class
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also Diet Drugs I, 282 F.3d at 226.
45. Preliminary Order, supra note 44; Settlement Agreement, supra note 34, § IV.D.2.
46. Settlement Agreement, supra note 34, § IV.D.2.c.
47. Frankel, supra note 36, at 95.
48. Pretrial Order No. 1415, In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 28, 2000), available at http://www.fenphen1203.com/files/13132034.pdf [hereinafter
Certification Order]; Memorandum, supra note 36; see also Diet Drugs I, 282 F.3d at 226.
49. Certification Order, supra note 48, ¶¶ 1, 7.
50. Id. ¶ 1.
members an opportunity to opt out as long as they did so by March
23, 2000.45 Class members who exercised this initial opt-out right
were free to initiate or maintain litigation against Wyeth “without
any limitation, impediment or defense arising from the terms of the
Settlement Agreement.”46 But class members who opted out would
have to prove that the diet drugs had caused their heart valve
damage, an element of their claim that would not have to be proven
if they stayed in the class.47
In May 2000, after the expiration of the initial opt-out period, the
district court held a fairness hearing. In August 2000, the court
entered a final order certifying the class and approving the
settlement.48 The final order incorporated the “definitions and
terms” of the Settlement Agreement into the order and enjoined all
class members who had not or did not opt out in a timely manner
from asserting or continuing to prosecute any claim covered by the
settlement against Wyeth.49 The order further provided that the
federal district court “hereby retains continuing and exclusive
jurisdiction over this action and each of the Parties, including
[Wyeth] and the class members, to administer, supervise, interpret
and enforce the Settlement.”50
In addition to the initial opt-out right afforded by the district
court’s preliminary certification order, the Settlement Agreement
approved by the court in its final order afforded class members
three additional opportunities to opt out, all of which contemplated
ex post changes that might have altered the class members’ initial
calculus. First, the Settlement Agreement afforded a “financial
insecurity opt-out right” to class members with specified medical
conditions if Wyeth failed to make timely payments to the Settle-
ment Trust Funds created to fund the settlement, or if a court
determined that the Settlement Trust Funds lacked sufficient
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51. Settlement Agreement, supra note 34, § III.E.9.
52. Id. §§ I.53.e, I.53.g, III.E.9. The sixth and seventh amendments to the Settlement
Agreement afforded additional limited opt-out rights and extinguished certain other opt-out
rights. Settlement Agreement § IV.D.5 (as amended through the sixth amendment) (on file
with the author); Seventh Amendment to the Nationwide Class Action Settlement
Agreement with American Home Products Corp. §§ XI.A, XII, In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 99-20593 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2004), available at http://www.fenphen1203.com/files//
8664066.pdf (Part 1), http://www.fenphen1203.com/files/8664964.pdf (Part 2).
53. FDA Positive heart valve conditions were defined as conditions in which the
individual had “mild or greater regurgitation of the aortic valve and/or moderate or greater
regurgitation of the mitral valve.” Settlement Agreement, supra note 34, § I.22.
54. Id. §§ II.C, IV.D.3. The twelve-month screening period began upon the final judicial
approval date of the settlement. Id. § I.49.
55. Id. §§ I.19, IV.D.3.b.
56. Id. § IV.D.3.c.
57. Id. §§ I.53.e, I.53.g, IV.D.3.c.
assets to pay outstanding settlement-related obligations.51 This
opt-out right protected those who had planned to participate in
the settlement, but whose rights thereunder had become less
secure. Class members exercising financial insecurity opt-out rights
were barred from suing for consumer fraud or medical screening
and monitoring but remained free to seek punitive or multiple
damages.52
Second, the Settlement Agreement afforded an intermediate
opt-out right to members of the class who were diagnosed as
having medically significant valvular regurgitation (referred to as
“FDA Positive” regurgitation of blood through the valves)53 after
September 30, 1999, but before the end of the twelve-month
screening period during which class members were entitled to
echocardiograms.54 This intermediate opt-out right protected those
who may not have been aware of their valvular condition in time to
exercise the initial opt-out right, but who later learned that they
were FDA Positive and wished to pursue their claims independ-
ently. Eligible class members had to exercise this opt-out right no
later than 120 days after the end of the screening period.55 Class
members who exercised this intermediate opt-out right were free to
initiate or maintain litigation against Wyeth, but only for FDA
Positive heart valve conditions.56 Such class members were barred
from suing for consumer fraud or medical screening and monitoring,
and from seeking punitive, exemplary, or multiple damages.57 In
addition, these class members could not invoke any verdict or
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58. Id. § IV.D.3.c. Wyeth agreed not to raise the statute of limitations, repose, or laches
as a defense, or any defense based on “splitting” the cause of action, as long as the class
member commenced suit within one year from the date on which she exercised the
intermediate opt-out right. Id.
59. Id. §§ IV.C.2, IV.D.4.a.
60. Id. §§ I.19, IV.D.3.b.
61. Id. § IV.D.4.c.
62. Id. §§ I.53.e, I.53.g, IV.D.4.c. As with the intermediate opt-out rights, Wyeth agreed
not to raise the statute of limitations and other defenses. Id. § IV.D.4.c.
63. Id. §§ IV.D.3.c, IV.D.4.c (emphasis added).
judgment against Wyeth under the doctrines of claim or issue
preclusion.58
Third, the Settlement Agreement afforded a back-end opt-out
right to class members who, before the end of 2015, developed levels
of regurgitation serious enough to entitle them to compensatory
damages under the Settlement Agreement (referred to as a “Matrix-
Level Condition”) if they had been diagnosed with specified valvular
problems by the end of the screening period, had timely registered
for further settlement benefits, and had not yet claimed Matrix
Compensation Benefits.59 This back-end opt-out right protected
those who were previously aware that they suffered from some
valvular disease, but whose condition had worsened significantly.
Eligible class members had to exercise this back-end opt-out right
within 120 days after learning they had developed a Matrix-Level
Condition.60 Class members who exercised a back-end opt-out right
were free to initiate or maintain litigation against Wyeth, but only
for specified medical conditions.61 Like those with intermediate opt-
out rights, class members exercising back-end opt-out rights were
barred from suing for consumer fraud or medical screening and
monitoring, from seeking punitive, exemplary, or multiple damages,
and from using any prior verdict or judgment against Wyeth under
preclusion doctrine.62 The Settlement Agreement further provided
that:
If, at any time after a Class Member exercises an Intermediate
[or Back-End] Opt-Out right, the Class Member initiates a
lawsuit seeking to pursue a Settled Claim against [Wyeth] or
any other Released Party, the Released Party shall have the
right to challenge, in such lawsuit only, whether the opt-out was
timely and proper, including whether the Class Member was
eligible to exercise such an opt-out right.63
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64. See Memorandum, supra note 36, at **16-17 (describing PPH).
65. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 34, §§ I.46, I.53.
66. Id. § VII.E; see also Diet Drugs I, 282 F.3d 220, 237 n.13 (3d Cir. 2002).
67. According to one account, fifty thousand people exercised initial opt-out rights alone.
See Frankel, supra note 36, at 95. Assuming a class size of approximately six million (the
number of people who had taken the drugs), id. at 94, the opt-out rate would have been
approximately 0.83 percent, lower than the mean and median opt-out rates for mass tort
cases. See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
68. See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 220 F. Supp. 2d 414, 420 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 2002),
appeal dismissed, 93 F. App’x 345 (3d Cir. 2004).
Finally, because the Settlement Agreement did not purport to
settle claims based on primary pulmonary hypertension (PPH),
a progressive disease that inevitably results in death,64 class
members suffering from PPH remained free to bring claims
outside the settlement, even for punitive, exemplary, or multiple
damages, as long as they had not received benefits for a Matrix-
Level Condition.65
Because Wyeth’s objective was to reach a “global” settlement of
the claims of fen-phen users, it reserved for itself the “option to
terminate and withdraw from the Settlement Agreement, in its sole
discretion, based upon the number of persons who have timely and
properly elected during the Initial Opt-Out Period to be excluded
from the Settlement Class.”66
C. Federal Judicial Regulation of Fen-phen Litigation in State
Court
As might have been expected with a class numbering in the
millions, many individuals chose to exercise their opt-out rights.67
Notwithstanding the provision in the Settlement Agreement
barring Wyeth from challenging the class members’ eligibility to opt
out in any suit other than an opt-out action, Wyeth returned on
many occasions to the federal district court that had approved the
settlement and asked it to enforce the limitations imposed on those
opting out. Wyeth also asked the federal court to monitor fen-phen-
related litigation pending in other courts. By this time, Judge
Bechtle, who had approved the settlement, had retired68 and the
fen-phen class action had been assigned to Judge Harvey Bartle III.
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69. See Diet Drugs I, 282 F.3d 220, 228, 242 (3d Cir. 2002); Memorandum and Pretrial
Order No. 2793, at **16-28, In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4744 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2003).
70. Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 2654, at *1, In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 99-20593, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23599 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2002) [hereinafter
Memorandum & PTO 2654].
71. Id. at *5.
This section of the Article examines several of the instances in
which Wyeth turned to Judge Bartle for assistance.69
When absent class members exercising intermediate opt-out
rights filed independent actions in state court, Wyeth returned to
federal court seeking an order that would have required the state
courts in which the class members sued to “determine eligibility
for an intermediate opt-out ... as soon as practicable and to
prohibit them from referring the issue for decision by the jury at
trial.”70 Recognizing that it had retained jurisdiction to enforce the
settlement, the district court nevertheless emphasized that the
Settlement Agreement itself explicitly provided that the state opt-
out court, rather than the federal district court, had sole authority
to “decide the issues of the timeliness and propriety, including the
eligibility of the class member to opt-out.”71 The federal court
disclaimed any authority to direct the state court how or when to
determine the eligibility issue. The federal court went on to rec-
ognize the logistical difficulties that would arise if it presumed to
exercise such authority:
Even if we had the authority to do so, we do not see how we
could impose a timetable on the state courts. The progress and
scheduling of the various steps in an opt-out case are clearly
beyond our ken. The question of timeliness of the opt-out, for
example, may be relatively easy to resolve at an early stage,
based on undisputed facts. Other aspects may be much more
complicated. The timing and manner of an opt-out ruling are
likely to depend on a myriad of factors best known to the state
court.... [I]t is for the opt-out court to work out when and how
the opt-out issues are to be determined and what type of
hearing, fact-finding, or other procedure is appropriate, consis-
tent with fairness and local law. So much depends on the
particulars of an individual case that it is not surprising that the
Settlement Agreement requires any intermediate or back-end
opt-out “challenge” by a Released Party, and that includes any
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72. Id. at **5-6.
73. In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593, 2003 WL 22518617, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 10, 2003).
74. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
75. See Pretrial Order No. 2867, at *3, In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9818 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2003) [hereinafter PTO 2867].
76. Settlement Agreement, supra note 34, § I.53.a.
77. PTO 2867, supra note 75, at *5.
78. Id. at *4.
challenge to procedure or scheduling, to be decided “in such
lawsuit only.”72
The federal district court thus recognized, apart from the limita-
tions on its authority built into the Settlement Agreement, the
practical problems that would have arisen had it attempted to
micromanage opt-out litigation in state courts under the guise of
enforcing the settlement.
Given this recognition, it is surprising that the district court later
entered numerous injunctions barring absent class members from
introducing specified evidence in state court. In one of these cases,
a class member, Merle Hall, filed suit against Wyeth in Texas state
court, claiming that she had developed PPH as a result of her
ingestion of Pondimin.73 Because the Settlement Agreement did not
bar independent claims for PPH,74 Hall was free to seek both
compensatory and punitive damages from Wyeth. Hall wished to
offer evidence not only of PPH, but also of VHD and neurotoxicity,
which she claimed was necessary to support her PPH claim under
Texas law and relevant to her claim for punitive damages.75
Because both VHD and neurotoxicity were settled claims under the
Settlement Agreement,76 and because Hall had not opted out, the
federal court enjoined her from introducing any evidence in state
court that related to VHD, neurotoxicity, or Wyeth’s conduct with
respect thereto.77 Rejecting Hall’s claim that the evidence was
necessary under Texas law to prove her claim, the federal court
concluded that “[a] party simply may not hide behind the substan-
tive law, or the procedural or evidentiary rules of any state to
undermine or evade the terms of the Settlement Agreement.”78
Wyeth was concerned that plaintiffs who suffered from PPH
would offer proof of the settled claims to bolster their claims for
punitive damages. Wyeth was even more concerned, however, that
opt-out plaintiffs who did not suffer from PPH and who were not
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79. Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 2717, at 6, In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 99-20593 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2003), available at http://www.fenphen1203.com/files/
13196153.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum & PTO 2717], vacated by Pretrial Order No. 2828,
In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2003), available at
http://www.fenphen1203.com/files/13196681.pdf [hereinafter PTO 2828], vacated by Diet
Drugs II, 369 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2004).
80. Note the distinction between primary pulmonary hypertension (PPH), an inevitably
fatal condition, and the more common pulmonary hypertension that is secondary to VHD,
which is referred to as PH.
81. See Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 3123, In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 99-20593 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2003), available at http://www.fenphen1203.com/files/
13247243.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum & PTO 3123]; Pretrial Order No. 2883, In re Diet
Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593 (E.D. Pa. June 10, 2003), available at http://www.
fenphen1203.com/files/13236672.pdf, vacated by Diet Drugs II, 369 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2004);
Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 2828, In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99-
20593, 2003 WL 22023361 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Memorandum & PTO 2828],
vacated by Diet Drugs II, 369 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2004); Memorandum and Pretrial Order No.
2680, In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2002), available
at http://www.fenphen1203.com/files/13191257.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum & PTO 2680],
vacated by Diet Drugs II, 369 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2004); Memorandum and Pretrial Order No.
2625, In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2002), available
at http://www.fenphen1203.com/files/ 13188244.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum & PTO 2625],
vacated by PTO 2828, supra note 79.
permitted to seek punitive damages would seek to offer evidence of
PPH and the grave health risks that fen-phen posed in an effort to
inflame the jury so that it would indirectly award punitive damages
by inflating the award of compensatory damages. The district court
appreciated these concerns, noting that if counsel for the opt-out
plaintiffs were permitted to offer proof supporting punitive
damages, the “floodgates [would] open, and the prohibition against
punitive damages in the court approved Settlement Agreement
[would] be nothing but a dead letter, with potentially dire conse-
quences for the settlement and the ability of the thousands of class
members to obtain compensation.”79
In light of these concerns, when absent class members who had
exercised intermediate opt-out rights filed suit in the state courts
of Texas, Mississippi, and Louisiana, the federal district court
enjoined them from offering evidence in state court that related,
directly or indirectly, to punitive damages, including evidence of:
(1) PPH; (2) any other medical condition caused by fen-phen other
than VHD or pulmonary hypertension;80 (3) malicious or wanton
conduct by Wyeth; (4) Wyeth’s marketing strategies; and (5)
Wyeth’s profits, size, or financial condition.81
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82. Memorandum & PTO 2625, supra note 81, at 5.
83. Id.
84. Memorandum & PTO 2680, supra note 81, at 6-7.
85. Memorandum & PTO 2717, supra note 79, at 7.
86. Id. at 7-8, vacated by PTO 2828, supra note 79.
The federal district court rejected the argument that its involve-
ment in the state case would “amount to improper interference with
the evidentiary issues before the state court,”82 citing the district
court’s retention of continuing jurisdiction over the action and its
authority to ensure that class members who exercised intermediate
opt-out rights did not “circumvent the Settlement Agreement by
seeking protection under the state’s evidentiary rules.”83 The
district court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that a discussion
of Wyeth’s knowledge of health risks posed by fen-phen and its
marketing strategy was necessary to establish causation:
The jury will decide the issue of causation based on the testi-
mony of medical experts, irrespective of the nature of Wyeth’s
behavior, be it wanton or innocent or somewhere in between.
Beyond any doubt, as the state trial judge recognized, the real
purpose of the proposed charge [to the jury] is to inject the issue
of punitive damages into this case, and that violates ... the
Nationwide Class Action Settlement Agreement.... The terms of
the Settlement Agreement approved by this court ... prevail over
state law, whether the latter is characterized as substantive,
evidentiary, or procedural.84
When Wyeth complained to the district court that the lawyer
representing the Texas plaintiffs had violated the injunction, the
court not only held the lawyer in civil contempt,85 but also enjoined
him from proceeding to trial in state court until he submitted a
statement identifying, among other things, his trial exhibits,
witness list, and points for charge. Although conceding that “it will
be for the state trial judge to decide on the exact contours of the
evidence, arguments, and statements to be presented to the court
and to the jury” and expressing reluctance “to become involved in
such detail,” the federal district court nevertheless concluded that
“the obdurate behavior of [plaintiff’s lawyer] leaves us no alterna-
tive if the terms of the Settlement Agreement are to be upheld.”86
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87. Memorandum & PTO 2828, supra note 81, at *2, **4-20.
88. Id. at *19.
89. Id. at *3.
90. See id. at *8, **11-12.
91. Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 3088, at *15, In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab.
Later, the federal district court carefully reviewed over one
hundred exhibits and numerous pages of contested deposition
testimony to determine whether the materials were admissible
or ran afoul of the Settlement Agreement, ordering redactions
of pages, paragraphs, or even just a few words, to ensure that
plaintiffs did not seek punitive damages indirectly.87 The federal
court closed its voluminous opinion, noting with apparent regret
that “we will not be present at the trial and cannot rule in advance
on every possible contingency.”88
Ceding some authority, the district court initially left it for the
state trial court to determine if references in exhibits to “pulmonary
hypertension” meant PPH, the inevitably fatal condition (in which
case the exhibit would be inadmissible), or the more common
pulmonary hypertension that is secondary to VHD (in which case
the exhibit might be admissible): “where the phrase ‘pulmonary
hypertension’ or PH is used, we will defer to the trial judge who will
be in a better position to make a ruling on proffered exhibits and
testimony consistent with this court’s PTO.”89
But even this forbearance ultimately gave way when the district
court later enjoined opt-out plaintiffs suing in Georgia and Missis-
sippi state courts from offering into evidence a Pondimin label that
disclosed four cases of “pulmonary hypertension” (the “four cases”
label) and a warning that the FDA had considered requiring Wyeth
to include on the Redux label within a black border (the “black box”
warning). Even though the district court had previously declined to
prohibit the introduction of these exhibits in state court90 and even
though both the four cases label and the black box warning used the
words “pulmonary hypertension” rather than PPH, the federal court
ultimately concluded, after reviewing the record in the case, that
both the label and the warning described PPH rather than PH.
Because the opt-out plaintiffs were seeking damages only for VHD,
the district court concluded that “any effort to inject PPH into their
trials [could] only be for the purpose of obtaining punitive damages,
in fact if not in name.”91 Conceding that it had earlier deferred to
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Litig., No. 99-20593, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20205 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2003) [hereinafter
Memorandum & PTO 3088], vacated by Diet Drugs II, 369 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2004).
92. Id. at *17.
93. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
94. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
95. See Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 34 (2002); see also infra Part
III.A.1.
the state trial judge “to determine whether the evidence involving
the four cases label and the black box warning related to PH or to
PPH,” the federal court nevertheless concluded that it was now in
a position to make that judgment itself, “having a more complete
record.”92
The fen-phen litigation dramatically illustrates some of the
curious complications that may arise in the enforcement of the
limitations built into back-end opt-out rights. With this illustration
as a backdrop, this Article now analyzes three categories of
complications: jurisdictional complications, federalism complica-
tions, and equitable and practical complications. These complica-
tions are likely to arise if a federal court approves a class action
settlement affording limited back-end opt-out rights; absent class
members who exercise such rights sue the defendant in state court,
bringing only claims that arise under state law; and the defendant
returns to the federal court that approved the settlement, request-
ing an injunction to bar the opt-out plaintiffs from seeking “more”
relief than the limited downstream opt-out right afforded them.
III. JURISDICTIONAL COMPLICATIONS
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In recent years, Congress has enacted laws, including CAFA93
and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
(SLUSA),94 that reflect deep skepticism about the ability of state
courts to adjudicate nationwide class actions and even the suitabil-
ity of state law to address certain types of problems. At the same
time, however, the Supreme Court has barred the removal to
federal court of state court actions over which original federal
jurisdiction is lacking, even when the state actions threaten to
frustrate previously issued federal orders.95 The present jurisdic-
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96. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000). See generally Joan Steinman, The Newest Frontier of
Judicial Activism: Removal Under the All Writs Act, 80 B.U. L. REV. 773, 778-80 (2000).
97. 537 U.S. 28 (2002). See generally Lonny S. Hoffman, Intersections of State and
Federal Power: State Judges, Federal Law, and the “Reliance Principle,” 81 TUL. L. REV. 283,
311-15 (2006); Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Removal Jurisdiction and the All Writs Act, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 401 (1999) (critiquing the pre-Syngenta practice of removal under the All
Writs Act); Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Syngenta, Stephenson, and the Federal Judicial
Injunctive Power, 37 AKRON L. REV. 605, 607-19 (2004) (analyzing Syngenta) [hereinafter
Hoffman, Syngenta]; Steinman, supra note 96, at 794-854 (analyzing the pre-Syngenta
practice of removal under the All Writs Act and concluding that it “is neither necessary nor
authorized”).
98. Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 34.
99. Id. at 32 (quoting Pa. Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 41 (1985)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
100. Id.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000).
102. Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 32.
103. Id. at 32-33 (citation omitted).
tional issue arises against this backdrop of tension in the dynamic
federalism landscape.
1. Removal Jurisdiction
The All Writs Act authorizes federal courts to “issue all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”96 In Syngenta Crop
Protection, Inc. v. Henson,97 the Supreme Court unanimously
decided that the Act does not authorize removal of a state court
action over which the district court lacks original jurisdiction even
where the state court action threatens to frustrate a federal court
order.98 Conceding that it had previously viewed the All Writs Act
as “fill[ing] the interstices of federal judicial power when those gaps
threate[n] to thwart the otherwise proper exercise of federal courts’
jurisdiction,”99 the Syngenta Court went on to note that “[w]here a
statute specifically addresses the particular issue at hand, it is
that authority, and not the All Writs Act, that is controlling.”100
Because the general removal statute authorizes removal only of
actions “of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction,”101 and because the removal statute is to be
strictly construed,102 the Court concluded that a defendant may not
invoke the All Writs Act to avoid compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements of the removal statute.103
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105. Id. at 34.
106. Id. at 34 n.*.
107. 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3523, at 82-
85 (2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 2006) (footnotes omitted).
Nor was the Court persuaded that “some combination of the All
Writs Act and the doctrine of ancillary enforcement jurisdiction”
supported the removal of an action pending in state court of which
the federal district court lacked original jurisdiction.104 Even if
the federal court that approved the settlement of the class action
had retained jurisdiction, as the federal court in the fen-phen class
action had, that retention would not support an assertion of
removal jurisdiction over a state law claim pending in state court.
“[I]nvocation of ancillary jurisdiction, like invocation of the All
Writs Act, does not dispense with the need for compliance with
statutory [removal] requirements.”105 Thus, if a defendant seeks
to remove a non-diverse back-end opt-out plaintiff’s state law
claim in an effort to enforce judicially approved limitations built
into the opt-out right, the federal court will lack jurisdiction under
Syngenta. 
But if Syngenta made clear that a federal court would lack
removal jurisdiction in these circumstances, a footnote in the case
suggested that a federal court nevertheless would have authority
to enter an injunction against the state court action: “[o]ne in [the
defendant’s] position may apply to the court that approved a
settlement for an injunction requiring dismissal of a rival action.”106
Part III.A.2 addresses this doctrine of ancillary enforcement juris-
diction.
2. Ancillary Jurisdiction
Under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction,
a district court acquires jurisdiction of a case or controversy in
its entirety, and, as an incident to the disposition of the matter
properly before it, it may decide other matters raised by the case
of which it could not take cognizance were they independently
presented.... The situations in which ancillary jurisdiction has
been invoked include proceedings involving ... settlement
agreements, ... and injunction[s], among others.107
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108. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378 (1994).
109. Id. at 380; see also Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 354 (1996).
110. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000).
111. Peacock, 516 U.S. at 355 (emphasis added).
112. Id.; see also Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc. v. Dazey Corp., 107 F.3d 1576, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (stating that “[e]ntry of judgment ... terminates both the federal case and any basis for
federal jurisdiction over the contractual agreement which occasioned the termination”)
(citation omitted).
113. Peacock, 516 U.S. at 356 (quoting Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166, 187
(1867)); see also Steinman, supra note 96, at 824-27.
In the words of a unanimous Supreme Court, the doctrine “recog-
nizes federal courts’ jurisdiction over some matters (otherwise
beyond their competence) that are incidental to other matters
properly before them.”108
The Supreme Court has distinguished between two types of
ancillary jurisdiction: the authority to hear state law claims not
otherwise within the federal court’s original jurisdiction if they are
brought together with factually interdependent federal claims; and
the federal court’s authority “to protect its proceedings and
vindicate its authority.”109
The first type of ancillary jurisdiction, which (together with
pendent and pendent party jurisdiction) is now covered by the
supplemental jurisdiction statute,110 is available only when the
federal claims and the factually related state law claims are filed
together in a single action. “[C]laims alleged to be factually
interdependent with and, hence, ancillary to claims brought in an
earlier federal lawsuit will not support federal jurisdiction over a
subsequent lawsuit.”111 This result follows because, in this scenario,
no claims are pending over which the district court has original
jurisdiction that can serve as an anchor for ancillary jurisdiction
over the factually related claim (for violation of the settlement
agreement, for example).112 Once a federal court enters a final
judgment in a class action lawsuit, therefore, it cannot exercise this
type of ancillary jurisdiction over motions to enjoin opt-out plain-
tiffs from violating the terms of a settlement agreement.
The second type of ancillary jurisdiction is designed to ensure
that a federal court can enforce its judgment. Without such
authority, “the judicial power would be incomplete and entirely
inadequate to the purposes for which it was conferred by the
Constitution.”113 Yet even this type of ancillary jurisdiction does not
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115. Id. at 376-82.
116. Id. at 378.
117. D. Patrick, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 8 F.3d 455, 460 (7th Cir. 1993).
118. See In re Valdez Fisheries Dev. Ass’n, 439 F.3d 545, 549 (9th Cir. 2006); Nat’l Presto
Indus., Inc. v. Dazey Corp., 107 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Lucille v. City of Chicago,
31 F.3d 546, 548 (7th Cir. 1994).
119. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 382.
120. See, e.g., Hehl v. City of Avon Lake, 90 F. App’x 797, 801 (6th Cir. 2004); Shaffer v.
GTE N., Inc., 284 F.3d 500, 503 (3d Cir. 2002); McAlpin v. Lexington 76 Auto Truck Stop,
Inc., 229 F.3d 491, 502 (6th Cir. 2000); Caudill v. N. Am. Media Corp., 200 F.3d 914, 917 (6th
Cir. 2000); In re Phar-Mor, Inc. Sec. Litig., 172 F.3d 270, 274-75 (3d Cir. 1999); Scelsa v. City
Univ. of N.Y., 76 F.3d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1996); Miener v. Mo. Dep’t of Mental Health, 62 F.3d
1126, 1127-28 (8th Cir. 1995); Lucille, 31 F.3d at 548.
necessarily authorize a federal court to enjoin violations of a
settlement agreement following entry of an order dismissing the
underlying action with prejudice. For example, according to the
Supreme Court in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co.,114 if no
independent basis exists for federal subject matter jurisdiction over
the motion to enforce the settlement agreement and if the federal
court failed to reserve jurisdiction to enforce the settlement at
the time it dismissed the underlying action or to incorporate the
terms of the settlement into its order, the federal district court
lacks jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement.115 Indeed,
“[e]nforcement of the settlement agreement ... whether through
award of damages or decree of specific performance, is more than
just a continuation or renewal of the dismissed suit, and hence
requires its own basis for jurisdiction.”116 Put differently, the
settlement agreement, standing alone, is merely a contract,117 and
the federal court would need an independent basis for jurisdiction
to compel performance of the contract or to sanction its breach.118
Only the state courts would have authority to enforce the settle-
ment agreement, unless an independent basis for federal subject
matter jurisdiction exists.119
The federal courts of appeals have strictly applied Kokkonen,
holding, for example, that even if the district court’s order of
dismissal referred to the settlement agreement and even if the
court approved the terms of the settlement, the federal court would
lack ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement
unless it retained jurisdiction or specifically incorporated the
agreement into its order.120 Likewise, “the district court’s incorpora-
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121. McAlpin, 229 F.3d at 502.
122. Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918, 924 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
123. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6) (stating that “[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for ... (6) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment”).
124. See, e.g., McAlpin, 229 F.3d at 502-03; Futernick v. Sumpter Twp., 207 F.3d 305, 313-
14 (6th Cir. 2000); Neuberg v. Michael Reese Hosp. Found., 123 F.3d 951, 954-55 (7th Cir.
1997); D.S. Atkinson, Inc. v. Lutin Cent. Servs. Co., No. 93-2294, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
40427, at *4 (1st Cir. Dec. 29, 1994) (per curiam); Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138,
140-41 (3d Cir. 1993); cf. Pigford, 292 F.3d at 925-27 (approving of the use of Rule 60(b)(5)
to modify the terms of the settlement agreement upon changed circumstances if the
modification is “suitably tailored to the changed circumstances”) (quoting Rufo v. Inmates
of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 391 (1992)).
125. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395-96, 398 (1990); Gompers v.
Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 451 (1911); Red Carpet Studios Div. of Source
Advantage, Ltd. v. Sater, 465 F.3d 642, 645 (6th Cir. 2006); Retail Flooring Dealers of Am.,
Inc. v. Beaulieu of Am., LLC, 339 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003); Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc.
v. Dazey Corp., 107 F.3d 1576, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
126. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994).
127. See id.; Sandpiper Vill. Condo. Ass’n v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 428 F.3d 831, 841
(9th Cir. 2005); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig. (Prudential I), 261 F.3d
tion in its dismissal order of only a single term of the parties’
twenty-page settlement agreement is insufficient to support the
court’s exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over the entire agree-
ment.”121 Even if a district court retained jurisdiction to enforce the
settlement, it would have ancillary jurisdiction only to enforce
specific provisions in the settlement, rather than free-floating
ancillary jurisdiction to enforce its “overarching ... purposes.”122
Additionally, the courts of appeals have been reluctant to allow use
of Rule 60(b)(6)123 to reopen a dismissed suit to enforce a settlement
agreement, noting that Rule 60 affords an extraordinary remedy
only in exceptional circumstances.124
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has recognized that even
after a voluntary dismissal or entry of a final judgment, a district
court retains ongoing jurisdiction to consider collateral issues, such
as costs, attorneys’ fees, Rule 11 sanctions, contempt sanctions, and
other violations of its orders or judgment.125 Thus, if a district court
order of dismissal incorporates the terms of the settlement agree-
ment, then “a breach of the agreement would be a violation of the
order, and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement would
therefore exist.”126  Likewise, if the district court order of dismissal
retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement, then the
court would have jurisdiction to do so.127 Some of the federal courts
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355, 367-68 (3d Cir. 2001).
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Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Burum v. Mankata State Univ., No.
98-696, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10714, at **4-6 (D. Minn. June 9, 2004); cf. In re Bond, 254
F.3d 669, 676 n.4 (7th Cir. 2001).
129. See, e.g., Shaffer v. GTE N., Inc., 284 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2002); Hagestad, 49 F.3d
at 1433.
130. See, e.g., Re/Max Int’l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 271 F.3d 633, 645 (6th Cir. 2001);
Schaefer Fan Co. v. J&D Mfg., 265 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Gilbert v. Monsanto Co.,
216 F.3d 695, 699-700 (8th Cir. 2000) (upholding jurisdiction to enforce an oral settlement
agreement even though the court had retained jurisdiction to enforce a written agreement);
Ford v. Neese, 119 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1997); Bell v. Schexnayder, 36 F.3d 447, 449 n.2
(5th Cir. 1994). But see Shaffer, 284 F.3d at 504.
131. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877, 880 (3d Cir.
1981), aff’d sub nom. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694 (1982); see also In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,
134 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1998); Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 199 (3d Cir.
1993).
of appeals have held that the district court lacks enforcement
jurisdiction in the absence of express language of retention in the
dismissal order,128 even if statements on the record appear to
demonstrate that the court actually intended to retain juris-
diction.129 Other courts have been more permissive, upholding
enforcement jurisdiction if the district court manifested an intent
to retain jurisdiction.130
Drawing on this body of case law, the lessons for a district court
approving a class action settlement and for counsel drafting a
settlement agreement and proposed order are clear. To ensure that
it will have authority to enforce the limitations built into back-end
opt-out rights or other terms of the settlement, the district court
should expressly retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the
settlement agreement or incorporate the terms of the agreement
into its order of dismissal.
B. Personal Jurisdiction over Class Members Who Opt Out
It is axiomatic that “[a] district court must have personal
jurisdiction over a party before it can enjoin its actions.”131 There-
fore, even if a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction to
entertain a request for an injunction to bar absent class members
from violating the terms of a court-approved settlement agreement,
it must determine whether it has personal jurisdiction to enjoin
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132. See Diane P. Wood, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597,
605 (1987) (noting that “only in the purely representational actions should the court’s judicial
jurisdiction over the absentees be assumed, once jurisdiction is established over the parties
before the court. Otherwise, the court’s right to adjudicate the claims of the absentees ...
must be assessed directly.”).
133. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). For recent scholarly reflections on Shutts, see Class Action
Symposium: The Twentieth Anniversary of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 74 UMKC L.
REV. 487, 487-797 (2006).
134. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 801, 806.
135. Id. at 806-07 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
136. Id. at 807.
137. Id. at 811.
those class members who lack minimum contacts with the state in
which the federal court sits.132 The starting place is Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, in which the Supreme Court considered
whether a state court’s adjudication of the claims of absent class
members who lack minimum contacts with the forum state violates
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.133
1. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts
The absent class members in Shutts received notice of the action
and were afforded an opportunity to opt out, but did not opt in or
otherwise affirmatively consent to the jurisdiction of the Kansas
court.134 The question in the case was whether the minimum
contacts requirement, which bars a state from exercising personal
jurisdiction over an absent defendant who has “no contacts, ties, or
relations” with the forum, extends to absent plaintiff class mem-
bers.135 In other words, the Court considered whether due process
permits a state court to adjudicate the claims of absent plaintiff
class members who lack minimum contacts with the forum.
The Court began by noting that the claim of an absent class
member, which would be extinguished by an adverse judgment, is
a “constitutionally recognized property interest possessed by each
of the plaintiffs.”136 The Court further noted that the Due Process
Clause protects “persons,” not “defendants,” so “absent plaintiffs as
well as absent defendants are entitled to some protection from the
jurisdiction of a forum State which seeks to adjudicate their
claims.”137 The real question, then, was whether the Due Process
Clause provides identical protections to defendants and absent
plaintiff class members.
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142. See id. at 809.
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As Professor Henry Monaghan has explained, the Court relied
on two distinct but related rationales, fundamental fairness and
consent, to support its conclusion that due process does not
guarantee absent plaintiff class members the protection of the
minimum contacts requirement.138 In concluding that it does not
violate fundamental fairness to assert jurisdiction over absent class
members who lack minimum contacts, the Court noted that the
burdens borne by absent plaintiff class members “are not of the
same order or magnitude as those” borne by defendants.139 Defen-
dants face a host of substantial burdens:
An out-of-state defendant summoned by a plaintiff is faced with
the full powers of the forum State to render judgment against it.
The defendant must generally hire counsel and travel to the
forum to defend itself from the plaintiff’s claim, or suffer a
default judgment. The defendant may be forced to participate in
extended and often costly discovery, and will be forced to
respond in damages or to comply with some other form of
remedy imposed by the court should it lose the suit. The
defendant may also face liability for court costs and attorney’s
fees.140
Given the substantiality of these burdens, “the minimum contacts
requirement of the Due Process Clause prevents the forum State
from unfairly imposing them upon the defendant.”141
Absent plaintiff class members do not face these burdens, the
Court opined.142 Unlike the defendant, absent plaintiff class mem-
bers are not required to appear in court, retain counsel, or fend for
themselves.143 Rather, the court and the named representatives are
charged with protecting their interests. Under the procedural rules
of many states, the court may not certify the class unless it finds
that the named representatives will adequately represent the
interests of the absent class members and that their claims are
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144. Id. at 809; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2), (4).
145. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 810; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
146. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 809; see also Bassett, supra note 6, at 521-22, 530-40.
147. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 810 (footnote omitted).
common in nature.144 Nor may class counsel dismiss or settle the
action without judicial approval.145 Even the defendant “has a great
interest in ensuring that the absent plaintiff’s claims are properly
before the forum.”146
The Shutts Court cited other relevant differences between
defendants and absent plaintiff class members:
[A]bsent plaintiff class members ... are almost never subject to
counterclaims or cross-claims, or liability for fees or costs.
Absent plaintiff class members are not subject to coercive or
punitive remedies. Nor will an adverse judgment typically bind
an absent plaintiff for any damages, although a valid adverse
judgment may extinguish any of the plaintiff’s claims which
were litigated.147
Given the differences in the positions of, and the burdens borne
by, defendants and absent plaintiff class members, the Court
concluded that it would not violate fundamental fairness to assert
jurisdiction over absent class members who lack minimum contacts
with the state as long as they are afforded certain due process
protections:
[A] forum State may exercise jurisdiction over the claim of an
absent class-action plaintiff, even though that plaintiff may not
possess the minimum contacts with the forum which would
support personal jurisdiction over a defendant. If the forum
State wishes to bind an absent plaintiff concerning a claim for
money damages or similar relief at law, it must provide minimal
procedural due process protection. The plaintiff must receive
notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the
litigation, whether in person or through counsel. The notice
must be the best practicable, “reasonably calculated, under all
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.”... [D]ue process requires at a minimum that an
absent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove
himself from the class by executing and returning an “opt out”
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149. Id. at 806, 811 (describing the defendant’s consent argument).
150. Id. at 812 (citation omitted).
151. Id. at 813. The 10.3 percent opt-out rate in Shutts is exponentially higher than the
average opt-out rate. See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
or “request for exclusion” form to the court. Finally, the Due
Process Clause of course requires that the named plaintiff at all
times adequately represent the interests of the absent class
members.148
According to Shutts, then, absent plaintiff class members may be
bound by a judgment rendered by a court in a state with which they
lack minimum contacts as long as they receive notice, an opportu-
nity to participate, an opportunity to opt out, and adequate
representation by the named representative.
The Court invoked a consent rationale to bolster its conclusion
that it does not violate fundamental fairness to deny absent
plaintiff class members the protection of the minimum contacts
test. The defendant argued that absent plaintiff class members
should not be deemed to consent to jurisdiction by virtue of their
failure to opt out. Due process requires a more affirmative showing
of consent, the defendant argued, such as execution of an “opt in”
form.149 Noting that “[a]ny plaintiff may consent to jurisdiction,” the
Court identified as “[t]he essential question ... how stringent the
requirement for a showing of consent will be.”150 In light of the
apparent efficacy of the opt-out opportunity in the Shutts litiga-
tion—3400 members of a class of 33,000 had opted out—the Court
concluded:
[T]he Constitution does not require more to protect what must
be the somewhat rare species of class member who is unwilling
to execute an “opt out” form, but whose claim is nonetheless so
important that he cannot be presumed to consent to being a
member of the class by his failure to do so.151 
Rather, the Court concluded that absent class members who decline
to opt out are deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction.
The consent rationale is subject to serious question. First, opt-out
rights are almost never exercised. According to an empirical study
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performed by Professors Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller,
“on average, less than 1 percent of class members opt-out ....”152
Furthermore, “[t]he median percentage of class members opting out
... is a mere 0.1 percent.”153 Even in mass tort cases, in which
prospective recoveries may be large enough to justify individual
lawsuits, the “median opt-out rate is 4.2 percent and the mean 4.6
percent.”154 Second, according to an earlier empirical study per-
formed by the Federal Judicial Center, notices of class action
settlements rarely provide the information necessary for class
members to estimate the amount of their own recovery.155 Further-
more, class members often misunderstand the notices and fail to
realize that inaction has legal consequences.156 These problems are
compounded by the fact that class action notices are not served by
process servers but rather are mailed (or published) and may be
mistaken for “junk mail.”157 Given the extremely low rate of opting
out and the great risk of misunderstanding, it is not reasonable to
equate a failure to opt out with affirmative consent to jurisdiction.
Rather, “[c]ommon sense indicates that apathy, not decision, is the
basis for inaction.”158 As Professor Tobias Barrington Wolff put it,
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160. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 306 (3d
Cir. 1998); Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 199 (3d Cir. 1993); In re Prudential
Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practices Litig., No. 95-4704, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22477, at **6-7
(D.N.J. May 6, 1999); Duhaime v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 177 F.R.D. 54, 60 (D.
Mass. 1997); In re Bolar Pharm. Co. Generic Drug Consumer Litig., MDL No. 849, 1994 WL
326522, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 5, 1994); see also 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1757, at 111 & n.14 (3d ed. 2005).
161. See, e.g., In re Gen’l Am. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 357 F.3d 800 (8th Cir.
2004); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 261 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2001);
Williams v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1998).
162. See, e.g., Carlough, 10 F.3d at 199; SR 7 Leasing, Inc. v. Curtis, 189 F.R.D. 681, 684-
85 (M.D. Ala. 1999); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 177 F.R.D. 216,
229 (D.N.J. 1997); In re Bolar Pharm. Co., 1994 WL 326522, at *2; In re Asbestos Sch. Litig.,
No. 83-0268, 1991 WL 61156, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1991), aff’d, 950 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1991);
see also Diet Drugs I, 282 F.3d 220, 229-32 (3d Cir. 2002).
it is “untenable” to assume that a failure to opt out constitutes
“a voluntary and autonomous choice to be subject to a court’s
adjudicatory jurisdiction.”159 
Notwithstanding these doubts about the consent rationale,
the lower federal courts have relied upon it to uphold settlements,
deeming absent class members who decline to opt out to have
consented to the court’s jurisdiction.160 Moreover, some federal
appellate courts have upheld federal injunctions enjoining absent
class members from pressing claims in state court that were
released or barred by a prior federal court judgment without even
considering whether the absent class members were subject to the
district court’s jurisdiction.161 Others have relied explicitly on
Shutts to uphold federal injunctions barring absent class members
from asserting claims resolved by the federal class action judgment
or released in a judicially approved settlement.162
Although Shutts certainly informs the personal jurisdiction
analysis in this context, three curious complications require further
attention: the appropriateness of deeming class members who
exercise back-end opt-out rights to have consented to the court’s
jurisdiction; the appropriateness of equating jurisdiction to bind
absent class members by a judgment with jurisdiction to enjoin
them from pressing their claims in the forum of their choice; and
the jurisdictional reach of federal courts. The sections that follow
address these complications in turn.
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163. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
164. Memorandum & PTO 3123, supra note 81, at 2; see also Memorandum & PTO 2828,
supra note 81, at *1.
165. Diet Drugs II, 369 F.3d 293, 299 (3d Cir. 2004) (footnote omitted).
2. Back-end Opt-out Plaintiffs and Consent
Shutts distinguished between two groups of absent plaintiff class
members: (1) those who receive notice and decline to opt out of the
class; and (2) those who opt out. The former are deemed to consent
to the court’s jurisdiction by failing to exercise the right to opt
out.163 Regarding members of the latter group, however, nothing
supports either an inference of consent or an argument that the
court has jurisdiction to enjoin them from suing elsewhere in the
absence of minimum contacts. Because the jurisdictional conse-
quences of opting out are so important, one must determine
whether it is appropriate to treat absent class members who
exercise back-end opt-out rights as though they had declined to opt
out. Put differently, does a person who exercises a back-end opt-out
right nevertheless submit to the rendering court’s jurisdiction?
The district court in the fen-phen litigation clearly treated those
exercising downstream opt-out rights as though they had declined
to opt out and therefore had consented to jurisdiction. In an opinion
accompanying an injunction against an individual who exercised
an intermediate opt-out right, the district court stated that
she “remains a class member and is bound by the terms of the
Settlement Agreement even though she has elected her opt-out
right and has chosen to sue [the defendant] individually.”164 The
court thus treated class members exercising intermediate opt-out
rights as though they had declined to opt out because they failed to
opt out initially. The Third Circuit agreed with this treatment: 
Putative class members who wished to opt out entirely from the
settlement, foregoing all benefits and any restrictions, were
obliged to file their opt-out notices by March 30, 2000. Drug
users who chose not to opt out initially became settlement class
members, bound not to assert “settled claims” against Wyeth
except as the agreement permits.165
 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
410 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:373
166. Settlement Agreement, supra note 34, §§ IV.D.3.c, IV.D.4.c.
167. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997).
The Third Circuit implicitly assumed that by failing to opt out
initially, the absent class members who later exercised downstream
opt-out rights had consented to the court’s jurisdiction and had
accepted the terms of the Settlement Agreement (including the bar
on recovery of punitive damages and other restrictions on recovery
outside the class action).166 In fact, it is fair to say that the entire
settlement was predicated on the class action court’s ability to bind
those who declined to opt out initially by the restrictions built into
the Settlement Agreement.
Notwithstanding the courts’ certitude, one should hesitate
before deeming downstream opt-out plaintiffs to have consented
to jurisdiction. After all, they may not have even known they had a
medical problem before the cut-off date for the initial opt-out. Upon
learning of their condition, they promptly opted out of the class
action. From their perspective, back-end opt-out plaintiffs are very
similar to class members who did opt out, and who did not consent
to the court’s jurisdiction. Granted, class action documents notified
class members that if they did not opt out by the initial opt-out
date, they would be bound by the restrictions in the settlement
approved by the court. If they truly wanted to preserve their
opportunity to sue for all forms of relief should they become ill, they
could have opted out initially, even before they learned of their
condition. As the Supreme Court recognized in Amchem, however,
“[e]ven if they fully appreciate the significance of class notice, those
without current afflictions may not have the information or
foresight needed to decide, intelligently, whether to stay in or opt
out.”167 The whole point of a back-end opt-out right, after all, is to
afford absent class members an opportunity to make an informed
decision after they know the nature of their condition. And by
exercising a back-end opt-out right, class members are explicitly
declining to submit their claims to the jurisdiction of the federal
court adjudicating the class action. Therefore, at least a colorable
argument exists that back-end opt-out plaintiffs do not consent to
the class action court’s jurisdiction.
Even if the consent rationale does not support jurisdiction to bind
back-end opt-out plaintiffs by the terms of the settlement agree-
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168. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985).
169. See Monaghan, supra note 138, at 1153; see also id. at 1185 (questioning “why, in
failing to opt out, absent class members had impliedly consented to the risk of future antisuit
injunctions”); Linda S. Mullenix, Class Actions, Personal Jurisdiction, and Plaintiffs’ Due
Process: Implications for Mass Tort Litigation, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 871, 898 (1995).
170. Steinman, supra note 96, at 860; see also id. at 860-61 (stating that “it seems
inappropriate to infer, from a mere failure to opt out, consent to the class action court’s
jurisdiction for the purpose of entering an anti-suit injunction against absent class
members”).
ment, however, the fundamental fairness rationale likely does.
Back-end opt-out plaintiffs are afforded all of the procedural
protections required by Shutts: notice, the opportunity to opt out
after they learn of their condition, and adequate representation.168
In this context, there is some assurance that these protections are
meaningful. For example, the opt-out plaintiffs’ very decision to
exclude themselves from the class action suggests the effectiveness
of the notice. Furthermore, because back-end opt-out plaintiffs
contemplate filing individual suits, they likely have access to
counsel, which increases the likelihood that they understand the
limitations built into the downstream opt-out right and the
settlement agreement. Therefore, even if doubts remain about the
consent rationale, the fairness rationale likely supports an asser-
tion of jurisdiction to bind back-end opt-out plaintiffs by the terms
of the settlement agreement.
3. Jurisdiction to Enjoin
If one questions whether back-end opt-out plaintiffs consent to
the class action court’s jurisdiction to bind them by the substantive
terms of the settlement, then certainly one should question whether
such plaintiffs consent to jurisdiction to enjoin them from suing
elsewhere.169 As Professor Joan Steinman observed, “[n]o Supreme
Court case makes clear that the consent to jurisdiction that may be
inferred from a failure to opt out ... encompasses consent to be
enjoined from prosecuting related litigation.”170 It is extremely
doubtful that a class member who exercises a downstream opt-out
right, expressing her intent not to present her claim to the class
action court, actually consents to its jurisdiction in a far more
onerous injunction proceeding.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
412 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:373
171. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 808-11.
172. See infra notes 182-207 and accompanying text.
173. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 810 (footnote omitted).
174. 826 A.2d 997 (Vt. 2003).
Nor does Shutts’s fairness rationale171 support jurisdiction to
enter an injunction in the absence of minimum contacts. Just
because it is fair for a court to adjudicate an absent class member’s
substantive claim in the absence of minimum contacts does not
necessarily mean that it is fair for that court to enjoin her from
suing elsewhere or from presenting evidence in support of a claim
that she expressly preserved by exercising a back-end opt-out right.
In fact, there are at least two reasons why the fairness calculus may
yield a different result in the injunction context: (1) absent class
members threatened with an injunction will face additional risks,
including punitive or coercive sanctions, and will receive fewer
protections than class members in the underlying class action; and
(2) absent class members threatened with an injunction who wish
to collaterally attack the class action judgment for inadequate
representation will have to do so before the class action court, even
if it sits in a state with which they lack minimum contacts, rather
than in a convenient forum of their choosing.172
In explicating the fairness rationale, the Shutts Court distin-
guished between the burdens borne by defendants and absent
plaintiff class members: “[A]bsent plaintiff class members ... are
almost never subject to counterclaims or cross-claims, or liability
for fees or costs. Absent plaintiff class members are not subject to
coercive or punitive remedies. Nor will an adverse judgment
typically bind an absent plaintiff for any damages ....”173 When
absent plaintiff class members do bear some or all of these burdens,
it may no longer be constitutional to dispense with the minimum
contacts requirement.
In State v. Homeside Lending, Inc.,174 for example, the Vermont
Supreme Court held that absent plaintiff class members who were
required to pay attorneys’ fees that exceeded their paltry recovery
could not be bound by the judgment unless they had minimum
contacts with the forum state: “where a class action can impose
monetary burdens on plaintiff class members that can exceed any
benefits, a state court has personal jurisdiction only over those class
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175. Id. at 1005 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
176. U.S. Dep’t of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 623 (1992).
177. See Steinman, supra note 96, at 861; cf. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 810.
178. Steinman, supra note 96, at 809.
179. Id. at 860.
180. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 808-11.
181. See United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 907 F.2d 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating
that “the All Writs Act requires ... that the persons enjoined have the ‘minimum contacts’
that are constitutionally required under due process”).
members who have minimum contacts with the state under
[International Shoe].”175
Back-end opt-out plaintiffs typically are not subject to the type
of financial liability imposed on the absent class members in
Homeside Lending. But if they violate an injunction that bars
them from pressing their claims in state court or from presenting
certain evidence in support of their claims, they can be held in
criminal or civil contempt. Then, these plaintiffs would be subject
to punitive sanctions or “equity’s traditional coercive sanctions for
contempt: fines and bodily commitment imposed pending compli-
ance or agreement to comply.”176 From this perspective, absent
plaintiff class members facing punitive or coercive remedies look a
lot like defendants: they have to show up in a distant forum to
contest the scope of the injunction and to explain why they should
not be held in contempt if they violate it.
Neither the class representative nor class counsel will appear in
the injunction proceeding to protect the back-end opt-out plaintiff’s
interests,177 and the defendant, who in the underlying class action
“ha[d] a great interest in ensuring that the absent plaintiff’s claims
are properly before the forum,”178 is now interested only in denying
the plaintiff the opportunity to recover in state court. And the back-
end opt-out plaintiff cannot opt out of the injunction proceedings.179
Therefore, because back-end opt-out plaintiffs who are threatened
with an injunction face more burdens and fewer protections than
standard absent plaintiff class members, the Shutts fairness
calculus180 may tip in favor of extending to them the protection of
the minimum contacts test.181
A further consideration reinforces this conclusion: a back-end opt-
out plaintiff seeking to avoid the binding effect of a class action
judgment by challenging the adequacy of representation afforded in
the class action should be permitted to bring the collateral attack
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182. See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 6, at 522-30; David A. Dana, Adequacy of Representation
After Stephenson: A Rawlsian/Behavioral Economics Approach to Class Action Settlements,
55 EMORY L.J. 279 (2006); Hoffman, Syngenta, supra note 97, at 619-38; Marcel Kahan &
Linda Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond: The Role of State Courts in Class Actions
Involving Exclusive Federal Claims, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 219; Susan P. Koniak, How Like a
Winter? The Plight of Absent Class Members Denied Adequate Representation, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1787 (2004); Monaghan, supra note 138; Richard A. Nagareda, Administering
Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 287 (2003); Wolff, supra note 157
(manuscript at 60-70); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 717 (2005); Patrick Woolley, The Availability of Collateral Attack for
Inadequate Representation in Class Suits, 79 TEX. L. REV. 383 (2000) [hereinafter Woolley,
Collateral Attack]; Patrick Woolley, Shutts and the Adequate Representation Requirement,
74 UMKC L. REV. 765 (2006) [hereinafter Woolley, Shutts].
183. Compare Wolfert v. Transamerica Home First, Inc., 439 F.3d 165, 171 (2d Cir. 2006),
and In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005), with Stephenson
v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 258-59 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’d in part by an equally divided
court and vacated in part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003), and Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 72 (5th
Cir. 1973); and compare State v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 826 A.2d 997, 1016-18 (Vt. 2003)
with Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641, 648-49 (9th Cir. 1999).
184. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812 (emphasis added).
185. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733
(1877); Woolley, Shutts, supra note 182, at 766 (stating that “absent class members who lack
minimum contacts with the forum and have not expressly consented to territorial jurisdiction
have a constitutional right to collaterally attack a class action judgment on grounds of
inadequate representation”) (footnote omitted).
in a convenient forum of her choice, rather than having to raise it
before the distant class action court in the injunction proceeding.
A vigorous debate rages in both the academy182 and the
judiciary183 on whether due process assures absent class members
an opportunity to collaterally attack a class action judgment on
grounds of inadequate representation if the class action court
already determined that issue. Several statements in Shutts
support the view that absent class members who lack minimum
contacts with the forum retain the right to collaterally attack the
judgment for inadequate representation in a forum of their choice.
First, as part of its fundamental fairness rationale, the Shutts
Court stated that the judgment may bind absent class members
only if “the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent[ed]
the[ir] interests.”184 Absent class members who are denied this
fundamental due process protection and who lack minimum
contacts are not subject to the court’s jurisdiction and are not bound
by the judgment.185 True, the class action court will have concluded
at the time of certification that “the representative parties will
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Attack, supra note 182, at 399; Woolley, Shutts, supra note 182, at 766 (stating that “a
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188. WASSERMAN, supra note 187, at 187.
189. See Woolley, Collateral Attack, supra note 182, at 388, 395.
190. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985); see also Monaghan, supra
note 138, at 1198.
191. See supra notes 139-48 and accompanying text; see also Woolley, Collateral Attack,
supra note 182, at 397.
192. See Woolley, Collateral Attack, supra note 182, at 398.
193. See id.
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”186 But that
determination, even if correct when made, does not take into
account the quality of representation provided later in the proceed-
ings.187 Even if objectors appear in the class action to challenge the
adequacy of representation later in the proceedings, they do not
represent the absent class members.188 And absent class members
who lack contacts with the forum cannot be compelled to raise their
objections in the class action itself.189
Second, Shutts stated that “an absent class-action plaintiff is not
required to do anything. He may sit back and allow the litigation to
run its course ....”190 Precisely because absent class members bear
few, if any, burdens, the Court concluded that it is fair to subject
them to jurisdiction in the absence of minimum contacts.191 But if
absent class members who lack minimum contacts are bound by the
class action court’s findings of adequacy, they will have to monitor
both the class action litigation and the quality of the representation
provided, and raise their objections in the potentially distant class
action court.192 Only if absent class members retain the opportunity
to collaterally attack the class action judgment on adequacy
grounds are they really free to “sit back.”193
The availability of a right to collaterally attack a class action
judgment for inadequate representation strongly counsels against
an assertion of jurisdiction by the class action court to enjoin back-
end opt-out plaintiffs from proceeding in state court. If the class
action court were to exercise such jurisdiction, back-end opt-out
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199. See id. at 764-65.
200. Id. at 762; see also id. at 768-69.
plaintiffs who seek to avoid the class action judgment by challeng-
ing the adequacy of the representation afforded would have to raise
their objections before the class action court in the injunction
proceeding. These plaintiffs would be forced to come before the class
action court even if they lack minimum contacts with the state in
which the court sits, rather than appearing in a convenient forum
of their choice.
Concern for preserving a right to contest the adequacy of
representation in a convenient forum led the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit to hold that a federal district court that certified
a mandatory class action could not enjoin absent class members
who lacked minimum contacts from pressing their individual claims
in different fora.194 The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania had certified a mandatory, multidistrict
class action to adjudicate federal antitrust claims against several
title insurance companies.195 The claims were ultimately settled.196
Two Arizona school boards, which had been absent class members
in the federal litigation, later filed suit in an Arizona state court
against the same defendants, alleging violations of Arizona anti-
trust law arising out of the same conduct.197 The defendants asked
the federal district court that approved the settlement to enjoin the
Arizona school boards from proceeding in state court because the
claims they sought to pursue were foreclosed by the settlement.198
The district court entered the injunction notwithstanding the school
boards’ lack of minimum contacts with Pennsylvania.199
In reversing, the Third Circuit reasoned that the school boards
“ha[d] lost more than the absent plaintiffs lost in Shutts, and yet
were given fewer procedural protections.”200 Like the absent class
members in Shutts, the absent class members in the real estate
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207. Id. at 769; see also id. at 762 (holding that “it would violate due process for the
district court to enjoin the [absent class members], which have not had minimum contacts
title litigation ran the risk that their monetary claims would be
lost in the federal class action in Philadelphia.201 But according to
the Third Circuit, the Shutts class members would have been bound
by the state court judgment only if they had been adequately
represented in the class action; they possessed the right to collater-
ally attack that judgment in a convenient forum of their choosing
if the representation was inadequate.202 In the title insurance
litigation, on the other hand, the absent class members would have
been deprived of the opportunity to challenge the adequacy of
representation in a convenient forum of their own choosing if the
district court had authority to enjoin their independent actions in
other fora.203 If the absent class members wished to avoid the
binding effect of the class action settlement because the represen-
tation had been inadequate, they would have had to travel from
Arizona to Philadelphia to litigate the inadequacy of representation
in a forum with which they had no contacts.204 Thus, they would
have lost more—the right to challenge adequacy in a convenient
forum—than the Shutts plaintiffs had risked.205
Because the absent plaintiff class members in the title insurance
litigation also received fewer procedural protections than the Shutts
plaintiffs—they had not been afforded an opportunity to opt out of
the class action—the Third Circuit reversed the injunction:206 
[G]iven that the absent member in this case loses more than the
plaintiffs lost in Shutts, if the member has not been given the
opportunity to opt out in a class action involving both important
injunctive relief and damage claims, the member must either
have minimum contacts with the forum or consent to jurisdic-
tion in order to be enjoined by the district court that entertained
the class action.207
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with the forum nor consented to jurisdiction”). The court made clear that it was not deciding
whether the district court would have had authority to enjoin the absent class members had
they been afforded an opportunity to opt out of the class action. Id. at 770. In another action,
the Third Circuit later held that even in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, absent class members
who lack minimum contacts with the forum cannot be enjoined from filing a parallel law suit
in state court if they have not yet been afforded an opportunity to opt out. Carlough v.
Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 201 (3d Cir. 1993). Likewise, when a federal court’s
certification of a nationwide class was vacated and a settlement of the class claims was
disapproved, the federal court could not enjoin the class members who lacked contacts with
the forum from presenting the same settlement to a state court because it lacked personal
jurisdiction over them. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,
134 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1998).
208. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir.
2003).
209. Id. at 768. For a critical analysis of In re Bridgestone/Firestone, see Timothy Kerr,
Cleaning Up One Mess to Create Another: Duplicative Class Actions, Federal Courts’
Injunctive Power, and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 217, 240-43
(2006); see also Wolff, supra note 157 (manuscript at 29) (characterizing Judge Easterbrook’s
analysis as “unsatisfying” but concluding that the “Seventh Circuit was correct in its core
holding”).
210. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 768-69.
Not all courts agree on the jurisdictional prerequisites for
injunctive relief in these circumstances. In the Bridgestone/
Firestone litigation, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
held that once it determined that a nationwide class could not be
certified on the facts of the case, the federal district court should
have enjoined absent class members from bringing another
nationwide class action on behalf of the same class.208 Even though
no class was certified and some or many of the absent (not-to-be)
class members may have lacked minimum contacts with the state
in which the district court sat and never were afforded an opportu-
nity to opt out, the appellate court held that they were subject to
personal jurisdiction by virtue of their status as class members,
citing Shutts.209 Conceding that the absent (not-to-be) class
members would be bound by the judgment only if they had been
adequately represented, the Seventh Circuit relied on the district
court’s original determination of adequacy made in support of a
certification decision that the Seventh Circuit itself reversed on
other grounds.210 Even though the absent (not-to-be) class members
had not had an opportunity to opt out of the certification decision
itself, the court concluded that they nevertheless were bound by the
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determination that a nationwide class could not be certified211 (but
they remained free to press their own claims individually).212
Although much of the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning conflicts with
the position taken herein, two important points reduce the conflict.
First, the court recognized that one of the claims raised in the class
action complaint arose under the civil RICO statute, which autho-
rizes nationwide service of process.213 Thus, the court arguably had
jurisdiction over all class members who had minimum contacts with
the country. Part III.B.4 explores the significance of the different
limitations on personal jurisdiction imposed by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses. Second, the court
further noted that the absent (not-to-be) class members did not seek
to avoid the binding effect of the class action judgment by arguing
that they had not been adequately represented.214 Thus, entry of an
injunction by the class action court did not have the effect of
denying the absent (not-to-be) class members the opportunity to
litigate the adequacy of representation in a forum of their choice.
4. Jurisdictional Reach of Federal Courts
The preceding sections of Part III.B questioned whether either of
Shutts’s rationales—fundamental fairness or consent—permits a
class action court to enter an injunction against absent class
members who lack minimum contacts with the state in which the
federal court sits. This section considers the argument that because
the jurisdictional reach of a federal court is broader than that of a
state court, the federal court has authority to enjoin absent class
members as long as they have minimum contacts with the country
as a whole.
Although it is widely acknowledged that the restrictions on
personal jurisdiction imposed by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clauses are different,215 and that federal
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216. Many of the federal courts of appeals have held that the constitutionality of an
exercise of jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment may be based on the party’s aggregated
contacts with the United States as a whole. See WASSERMAN, supra note 187, at 249-50, 261
n.111 (citing cases).
217. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
218. Monaghan, supra note 138, at 1153.
219. Id. at 1153 n.19; see also id. at 1166 n.75, 1167.
220. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4.
221. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(a).
222. See Woolley, Collateral Attack, supra note 182, at 395 n.37.
223. See id.
courts have broader authority than state courts,216 in many cases
the federal court’s jurisdictional reach nevertheless mirrors that of
the state court sitting next door. That is because Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A) permits federal courts to rely upon state
long-arm statutes for statutory authority to exercise jurisdiction;
but when they do so, Rule 4 limits their jurisdictional reach “to the
jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state in which
the district court is located.”217 Put differently, federal courts
relying on state long-arm statutes are bound by the more restrictive
Fourteenth Amendment due process standards and can exercise
jurisdiction only over parties who have minimum contacts with the
state in which the federal court sits. Professor Monaghan, who
maintains that class action courts cannot enjoin absent class
members from collaterally attacking judgments unless they have
minimum contacts with the state,218 has extended this reasoning to
federal courts “because Rule 4(k)(1)(A) ... generally limits a federal
court’s in personam jurisdiction to that of the state court next
door.”219
Although Rule 4(k)(1)(A) often means that the jurisdictional
reach of federal courts is restricted by the narrower Fourteenth
Amendment limits, that Rule plays no role when a class action
court seeks to enjoin back-end opt-out plaintiffs from pressing
claims in state court.220 Rule 4 governs service of a summons, which
is to “be directed to the defendant.”221 If the class action court seeks
to enjoin a back-end opt-out plaintiff from seeking recovery in state
court, the opt-out plaintiff assumes a defensive posture in the
injunction proceeding.222 But she does not become a “defendant,”
and she is not served with a summons under Rule 4.223 Accordingly,
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224. See Wolff, supra note 157 (manuscript at 42, 57); Woolley, Collateral Attack, supra
note 182, at 395 n.37.
225. See Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987); see also
4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1068.1
(3d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2006).
226. See Omni, 484 U.S. at 102 n.5 (declining to decide whether “a federal court could
exercise personal jurisdiction, consistent with the Fifth Amendment, based on an aggregation
of the defendant’s contacts with the Nation as a whole, rather than on its contacts with the
State in which the federal court sits”); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S.
102, 113 n.* (1987).
227. See, e.g., Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th
Cir. 2004); ISI Int’l, Inc. v. Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, 256 F.3d 548, 551 (7th Cir. 2001);
Tex. Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 314-15 (2d Cir. 1981);
see also WASSERMAN, supra note 187, at 249, 261 n.111 (citing cases); 4 WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 225, § 1068.1.
228. See Steinman, supra note 96, at 861 (stating that “[i]f the court ... employ[s] the All
Writs Act as its long-arm statute, the United States will be the sovereign with whom the
absent class members must have minimum contacts”); Wolff, supra note 157 (manuscript at
42); see also 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1789.1, at 575-76 (3d ed. 2005) (footnotes omitted); Miller &
Crump, supra note 156, at 29.
In upholding jurisdiction to enjoin the absent (not-to-be) class members from initiating
another nationwide class, the Seventh Circuit in Bridgestone/Firestone relied upon the
federal court’s “power to issue nationwide process” and the presence of an alleged class claim
the federal court’s jurisdictional reach is not restricted by Rule
4(k)(1)(A) or Fourteenth Amendment due process standards.224
If neither Rule 4(k)(1)(A) nor the Fourteenth Amendment limits
the federal court’s jurisdictional reach, then the court may assert
jurisdiction over back-end opt-out plaintiffs as long as there is
statutory authority and the assertion does not violate the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause.225 The Supreme Court has
declined to decide the appropriate standard for gauging assertions
of personal jurisdiction by federal courts under the Fifth Amend-
ment,226 but many of the federal courts of appeals have upheld
jurisdiction based upon the defendant’s aggregate contacts with the
country as a whole, rather than upon her contacts with the state in
which the court sits.227 Consequently, as long as statutory authority
exists, a federal court’s assertion of jurisdiction to enjoin a back-end
opt-out plaintiff who resides anywhere in the United States (or a
foreign plaintiff who has minimum contacts with the country as a
whole) likely will satisfy the Fifth Amendment minimum contacts
test even if neither the consent rationale nor the fundamental
fairness rationale from Shutts obtains.228
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arising under a federal statute that authorizes nationwide service of process. In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 768 (7th Cir. 2003).
229. See Omni, 484 U.S. at 104.
230. See Miller & Crump, supra note 156, at 31; cf. Wolff, supra note 157 (manuscript at
42).
231. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000); see infra Part IV.A.
232. United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174 (1977).
233. Monaghan, supra note 138, at 1190.
234. See Steinman, supra note 96, at 856-65; see also Wolff, supra note 157 (manuscript
at 58).
Two important caveats exist. First, even though the jurisdictional
limits imposed by the Fifth Amendment are less stringent than the
Fourteenth Amendment limits, in order for a federal court to take
advantage of the more expansive limits, a statute or rule must
authorize it.229 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the federal class
action rule, does not address jurisdiction over absent class members
in the underlying class action, let alone jurisdiction over back-end
opt-out plaintiffs in the injunction proceeding.230 The All Writs
Act, which authorizes federal courts to “issue all writs necessary
or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions,” might be
viewed as authorizing jurisdiction to enjoin back-end opt-out
plaintiffs nationwide if necessary in aid of the class action court’s
jurisdiction.231 In United States v. New York Telephone Co., a
divided Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he power conferred by
the Act extends, under appropriate circumstances, to persons
who, though not parties to the original action ... are in a position to
frustrate the implementation of a court order or the proper
administration of justice.”232 Professor Monaghan strenuously
questions whether “the Act should be construed as a general,
‘emergency all purpose’ nationwide long-arm statute.”233 In light of
the fairness of binding back-end opt-out plaintiffs by the class
action judgment established above in Part III.B.2, however, it
seems reasonable to conclude that when the All Writs Act autho-
rizes an injunction in aid of the class action court’s jurisdiction, it
authorizes personal jurisdiction to enjoin absent class members
against whom the injunction is issued subject to the Fifth Amend-
ment due process limitations.234
Second, in assessing the constitutionality of assertions of
jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court
requires not only that the defendant have minimum contacts with
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235. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (citations
omitted); see also 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 225, §§ 1067.2, 1067.6.
236. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113-16 (1987).
237. See, e.g., Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Lux. Inc.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 945-48
(11th Cir. 1997); Willingway Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ohio, 870 F. Supp.
1102, 1107-11 (S.D. Ga. 1994); Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp.
191, 203-04 (E.D. Pa. 1974); see also WASSERMAN, supra note 187, at 250.
238. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 225, § 1068.1 (stating that personal jurisdiction
pursuant to a nationwide service statute may be upheld whenever the other reasonableness
factors, in combination, “outweigh the burden on the defendant”).
239. See, e.g., Maryellen Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal
Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 85 (1984); see also Robert A. Lusardi,
Nationwide Service of Process: Due Process Limitations on the Power of the Sovereign, 33
VILL. L. REV. 1, 23, 32-38 (1988); Pamela J. Stephens, The Federal Court Across the Street:
Constitutional Limits on Federal Court Assertions of Personal Jurisdiction, 18 U. RICH. L.
REV. 697, 697-98, 722-23 (1984).
the state, but also that the assertion of jurisdiction be “reasonable,”
taking into account five reasonableness factors:
the burden on the defendant[;] ... the forum State’s interest in
adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief, at least when that interest is not
adequately protected by the plaintiff’s power to choose the
forum; the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the
most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies.235 
For example, even though a majority of the Court in Asahi con-
cluded that the defendant had minimum contacts with the forum
state, it held the assertion of jurisdiction unconstitutional because
it was unreasonable to compel the defendant to appear on the facts
of the case.236
Several federal courts have concluded that even if the aggregated
contacts test is met, an assertion of jurisdiction under the Fifth
Amendment must also be reasonable in light of the World-Wide
Volkswagen reasonableness factors or a similar fairness test that
considers the burden on the defendant.237 The Wright and Miller
treatise also advocates consideration of the reasonableness of an
assertion of jurisdiction even where Congress has adopted a nation-
wide service statute,238 as do other scholars.239 Thus, if a back-end
opt-out plaintiff initiates a lawsuit on a state law claim in a state
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240. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-95 (1991) (upholding
a forum selection clause in a non-negotiated form contract); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1972) (holding, in an admiralty case, that forum selection clauses are
“prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party
to be ‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances”) (footnote omitted); Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd.
court at home, the federal class action court’s jurisdiction to enjoin
her from presenting certain claims or evidence might violate the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause even if she has minimum
contacts with the country. This violation might occur if litigation
before the federal court would impose a great burden; if she would
lose her opportunity to challenge, in a convenient court of her
choosing, the adequacy of representation provided in the class
action; or if other factors would render the assertion of jurisdiction
unreasonable or unfair.
In conclusion, difficult and curious jurisdictional complications
arise when federal courts seek to enjoin back-end opt-out plaintiffs
from pressing their preserved claims in state court. Federal courts
in this situation should consider the reasonableness, under the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, of an assertion of jurisdic-
tion. In performing this reasonableness analysis, the court should
consider, among other things, the burden the back-end opt-out
plaintiff would face in having to appear in the class action court to
litigate the preclusive effect of the class action judgment. If the
back-end opt-out plaintiff seeks to avoid the binding effect of the
judgment by arguing that the representation provided in the class
action was inadequate, the court should consider her interest in
contesting adequacy in a convenient forum with which she has some
connection. In some cases, it may be that a grave burden on the
back-end opt-out plaintiff would render an assertion of jurisdiction
in the injunction proceeding by the class action court unconstitu-
tional.
To avoid these jurisdictional complications, lawyers crafting
settlement agreements and federal courts that approve them may
include in the back-end opt-out form an express waiver of potential
objections to the personal jurisdiction of the class action court in
the event it issues an injunction to enforce the limits built into
the back-end opt-out right. The Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutionality of choice-of-forum clauses, which contractually
waive objections to a court’s jurisdiction.240 Part III.B.1 expressed
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v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964) (stating that “it is settled ... that parties to a
contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court, to permit notice
to be served by the opposing party, or even to waive notice altogether”) (citations omitted).
241. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
242. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
243. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000).
244. See infra Part IV.C.
serious doubts about the Shutts consent rationale, but a waiver of
a jurisdictional objection incorporated into a back-end opt-out form
would constitute express consent, rather than consent implied
from inaction. Although reservations persist about absent class
members’ understanding of the material contained in class action
notices,241 class members who opt out often anticipate filing their
own individual lawsuits. These class members may have access to
counsel, who could ensure that the opt-out plaintiffs understand
that they are consenting to the class action court’s jurisdiction in
the event it deems an injunction necessary to enforce the settlement
agreement. In all events, if federal courts wish to exercise jurisdic-
tion over back-end opt-out plaintiffs throughout the country, they
should take steps to strengthen their authority to do so. 
Finally, even if the back-end opt-out plaintiff waives the jurisdic-
tional objection, the class action court should consider the reason-
ableness of compelling her to appear in a distant forum. The court
should perform this reasonableness analysis in light of the federal-
ism complications analyzed in Part IV.
IV. FEDERALISM COMPLICATIONS
Even if a federal district court has ancillary subject matter
jurisdiction to enter an injunction and personal jurisdiction over
absent class members exercising back-end opt-out rights, its au-
thority to enjoin pending state court litigation is bounded by two
federal statutes, the All Writs Act242 and the Anti-Injunction Act,243
and by judge-made abstention doctrine.244 Lawmakers crafted these
laws to reduce friction between state and federal courts by limiting
federal interference with pending state court proceedings. Part IV
considers whether federal courts can enforce the limits built into a
judicially approved settlement agreement without unduly straining
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245. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000).
246. In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., No. 83-0268, 1991 WL 61156, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1991)
(citing United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977)), aff’d, 950 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1991).
247. Id.
248. See, e.g., In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 335 (2d Cir. 1985).
249. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000). The Anti-Injunction Act has existed in some form since 1793.
Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146 (1988). See generally 17A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 4221-4226 (3d ed. 2007); Steinman,
federal-state relations or denying back-end opt-out plaintiffs the
rights they reserve.
A. Authority Granted by the All Writs Act
The All Writs Act authorizes federal courts to “issue all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”245 The courts have
interpreted the All Writs Act to authorize federal injunctions
against state court actions “where necessary to prevent relitigation
of an existing federal judgment,”246 and, even absent a federal
judgment, when necessary to “preserv[e] ... the federal court’s
jurisdiction or authority over an ongoing matter.”247 The All Writs
Act permits a district court to enjoin state court actions even when
the parties could invoke claim or issue preclusion in state court
against any subsequent suit brought on the matter already litigated
in federal court.248 In other words, a defendant who believes that a
federal judgment precludes a state court action may raise claim
preclusion as a defense in the state court or ask the federal court
that issued the judgment to enjoin the state court action. Thus, at
first blush, the All Writs Act appears to authorize a federal court to
enjoin absent class members exercising back-end opt-out rights
from seeking relief in state court that was barred by the terms of a
settlement approved by a federal court.
B. Limits Imposed by the Anti-Injunction Act
The authority to issue injunctions conferred by the All Writs Act
is limited by the Anti-Injunction Act, which prohibits federal courts
from issuing injunctions “to stay proceedings in a State court except
as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in
aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”249
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supra note 96, at 780-92.
250. See Diet Drugs II, 369 F.3d 293, 305 (3d Cir. 2004); Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc.,
10 F.3d 189, 201 n.9 (3d Cir. 1993); In re Baldwin-United, 770 F.2d at 335.
251. See, e.g., Ret. Sys. of Ala. v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 386 F.3d 419, 425 & n.5 (2d
Cir. 2004); Diet Drugs I, 282 F.3d 228, 239 (3d Cir. 2002); Prudential I, 261 F.3d 355, 365 (3d
Cir. 2001).
252. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965); Standard Microsys. Corp. v. Tex.
Instruments Inc., 916 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1990); 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 249, § 4222,
at 63-64. 
253. See, e.g., In re Bolar Pharm. Co., MDL No. 849, 1994 WL 326522, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July
5, 1994) (noting that a federal injunction granted two years before the state suit was initiated
“falls outside the scope of the [Anti-Injunction] Act”).
254. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970);
Prudential I, 261 F.3d at 365-66; 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 249, § 4222, at 62.
255. Winkler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 101 F.3d 1196, 1201 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that “a federal
injunction which falls short of bringing a state suit to a complete halt may nonetheless
violate the Anti-Injunction Act”).
256. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133,
144 (3d Cir. 1998); accord Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146 (1988).
The two statutes operate in tandem: the All Writs Act provides
positive authority for the issuance of a federal injunction against
state court proceedings but only if the injunction falls within one of
the three statutory exceptions in the Anti-Injunction Act.250 The
“necessary in aid of its jurisdiction” language in the two statutes
has been construed similarly.251
The Anti-Injunction Act bars only injunctions against pending
state actions,252 so if a district court, in its order approving a
settlement, enjoins absent class members from commencing liti-
gation on claims covered by the settlement, no Anti-Injunction Act
problems arise.253 On the other hand, if a federal court seeks to
enjoin an opt-out plaintiff from proceeding with a pending state
court action, it must invoke one of the three statutory exceptions.
A federal court cannot avoid the Anti-Injunction Act by purporting
to allow the state action to proceed while nevertheless barring the
parties from prosecuting it254 or from taking discovery on a particu-
lar issue.255
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Anti-Injunction Act’s
exceptions to be “very narrow indeed,”256 and it has stated:
Any doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction against
state court proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting
the state courts to proceed in an orderly fashion to finally
determine the controversy. The explicit wording of § 2283 itself
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257. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 297.
258. See Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 146; Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623,
630 (1977) (plurality opinion); Atl. Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 286; see also 17A WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 249, § 4221, at 50-51.
259. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000). See generally 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 249, § 4224;
Diane P. Wood, Fine-Tuning Judicial Federalism: A Proposal for Reform of the Anti-
Injunction Act, 1990 BYU L. REV. 289, 297-301.
260. To qualify, an Act of Congress need not refer explicitly to § 2283, nor need it expressly
authorize an injunction against state court proceeding. E.g., Vendo Co., 433 U.S. at 633
(plurality opinion); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 237-38 (1972); see 17A WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 249, § 4224, at 80-81. “The test ... is whether an Act of Congress, clearly creating
a federal right or remedy enforceable in a federal court of equity, could be given its intended
scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding.” Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 238. Professor
Martin Redish has criticized the Mitchum Court for “creat[ing] an oxymoronic ‘implied
express’ exception.” Martin H. Redish, Intersystemic Redundancy and Federal Court Power:
Proposing a Zero Tolerance Solution to the Duplicative Litigation Problem, 75 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1347, 1358 n.61 (2000).
261. See, e.g., In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 335 (2d Cir. 1985); Piambino v.
Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306, 1331-32 (5th Cir. 1980); Steinman, supra note 96, at 838-39.
262. In re Glenn W. Turner Enters. Litig., 521 F.2d 775, 781 (3d Cir. 1975); see also In re
Gen. Motors. Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 144 n.6 (3d
implies as much, and the fundamental principle of a dual system
of courts leads inevitably to that conclusion.257
 
Accordingly, in determining whether to enjoin an absent class
member who exercises a back-end opt-out right from proceeding in
state court, a federal district court should keep in mind the political
objectives underlying the Anti-Injunction Act: the preservation of
federalism and comity, and the reduction of intergovernmental
friction.258
1. “Expressly Authorized by Congress” Exception
The first exception permits a federal court to enjoin a pending
state court action if the injunction is “expressly authorized by Act
of Congress.”259 Even given the Supreme Court’s very broad reading
of this exception,260 it is not likely to authorize injunctions against
state court litigation initiated by opt-out plaintiffs. After all,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 is a rule of procedure, not an
Act of Congress,261 and because it explicitly “creates a mechanism
leaving parties in a (b)(3) action free to continue with any state
proceedings,” it cannot be read to authorize issuance of an injunc-
tion.262 The Third Circuit conceded as much in the fen-phen
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Cir. 1998); Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 202 (3d Cir. 1993).
263. Diet Drugs II, 369 F.3d 293, 305 (3d Cir. 2004).
264. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
265. Earlier versions of CAFA would have permitted absent class members to remove
state court class actions without the concurrence of class counsel, the defendant, or even
other members of the class. See S. 1751, 108th Cong. § 5 (2003); see also Wolff, supra note
157 (manuscript at 6) (noting that Congress “left the choice of access to federal court in the
hands of the very actors from which class members might require protection”: class counsel
and the defendant).
266. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000). See generally 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 249, § 4226;
George A. Martinez, The Anti-Injunction Act: Fending Off the New Attack on the Relitigation
Exception, 72 NEB. L. REV. 643 (1993); Wood, supra note 259, at 304-08.
267. See, e.g., Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 147 (1988); Nat’l Basketball
Ass’n v. Minn. Prof’l Basketball, Ltd. P’ship, 56 F.3d 866, 871 (8th Cir. 1995).
268. In re Glenn W. Turner Enters. Litig., 521 F.2d 775, 780 (3d Cir. 1975). Orders
that do not resolve the merits of the case, such as preliminary injunctions, denials of
class certification, and dismissals for lack of standing, nevertheless may support the
relitigation exception “provided that a critical issue concerning the case has been
adjudicated properly.” Canady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 1005, 1015 (8th Cir. 2002); accord
litigation, noting that the “injunctions at issue here were not
expressly authorized by statute.”263
Nor does the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)264 authorize
injunctions to enforce the limits built into back-end opt-out rights.
Although CAFA expresses a legislative judgment that federal courts
are better equipped than state courts to oversee nationwide class
actions, CAFA does not create exclusive federal jurisdiction over
nationwide class actions and provides no vehicle for absent class
members themselves to remove class actions filed in state court.265
Nor does CAFA expand diversity jurisdiction to permit back-end
opt-out plaintiffs to press their individual state-law claims against
non-diverse defendants in federal court or even contemplate such
individual suits. And it fails to authorize any form of injunctive
relief. A federal court seeking to enjoin back-end opt-out plaintiffs
from pursuing relief barred by a judicially approved settlement
agreement will have to look elsewhere for authority.
2. “To Protect Its Judgments” Exception
The Anti-Injunction Act also permits a federal court to enjoin a
pending state court action “to protect or effectuate its judgments.”266
This exception, referred to as the relitigation exception,267 applies
only when the federal court has rendered a judgment268 that would
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In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 765-67 (7th Cir.
2003); Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 56 F.3d at 871-72 (concluding that “a preliminary injunction
carries enough significance and finality to invoke the relitigation exception”); cf. 17A WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 249, § 4226, at 117-24 (concluding that a denial of class certification “is not
a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of the third exception”).
269. See, e.g., Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 147; In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck
Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 146 (3d Cir. 1998); In re Corrugated Container
Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1332, 1335 (5th Cir. 1981). The relitigation exception is available
only if the state court has not already been called upon to enforce the federal judgment. If
the state court has already considered and rejected the defendant’s argument that the state
claim is precluded by the federal judgment, then the federal court from which an injunction
is sought must give full faith and credit to the state court decision. See Parsons Steel, Inc.
v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 525-26 (1986); Battle v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 877 F.2d
877, 882 (11th Cir. 1989); In re Bolar Pharm. Co. Drug Consumer Litig., No. 849, 1994 WL
326522, at *9 n.6 (E.D. Pa. July 5, 1994).
270. See, e.g., Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981); Cromwell
v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 18, 24
(1982).
271. Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 148 (citing Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of
Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970)) (emphasis added).
preclude the state court action under the doctrines of claim or issue
preclusion.269 Because the federal court seeking to enforce the limits
built into a back-end opt-out right will have entered a final
judgment, it should have authority under the relitigation exception
to enter an injunction against the state court plaintiff. But the
relitigation exception may be both overbroad and underinclusive for
these purposes: it may permit a federal injunction against the
prosecution in state court of claims that the opt-out plaintiff clearly
preserved, and at the same time deny federal authority to enforce
other limits built into the settlement agreement. These complica-
tions reflect complexity in preclusion doctrine as well as federalism
concerns.
The doctrine of claim preclusion ordinarily bars relitigation not
only of theories that actually were presented in support of a claim,
but also of theories and evidence that might have been offered in
support of the claim presented.270 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
in Chick Kam Choo stated that “an essential prerequisite for
applying the relitigation exception [to the Anti-Injunction Act] is
that the claims or issues which the federal injunction insulates from
litigation in state proceedings actually have been decided by the
federal court. Moreover, ... this prerequisite is strict and narrow.”271
Some courts have read this language to mean that the scope of the
relitigation exception is narrower than the doctrine of claim
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272. Regions Bank of La. v. Rivet, 224 F.3d 483, 488 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Chick Kam
Choo, 486 U.S. at 148). An earlier opinion of the Fifth Circuit that took a less categorical
approach, Deus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 506, 525 (5th Cir. 1994), has been disavowed. Tex.
Commerce Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Florida, 138 F.3d 179, 182 (5th Cir. 1998).
273. See, e.g., Selletti v. Carey, 70 F. App’x 603, 605 (2d Cir. 2003); Hatcher v. Avis Rent-
A-Car Sys., Inc., 152 F.3d 540, 542-43 (6th Cir. 1998); Am. Town Ctr. v. Hall 83 Assocs., 912
F.2d 104, 112 n.2 (6th Cir. 1990); Staffer v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 878 F.2d 638, 643 (2d Cir.
1989) (stating that “[t]he relitigation exception does not protect the full res judicata effect of
a federal court’s judgment; rather, it protects only matters that actually have been decided
by a federal court”); see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Burke, 897 F.2d 734, 737 (4th Cir.
1990). For an analysis of some of these cases and a critique of this reading, see Martinez,
supra note 266, at 657-61. The Supreme Court in Parsons Steel declined to resolve this issue.
474 U.S. at 526 n.4.
274. Wolff, supra note 157 (manuscript at 55).
275. W. Sys., Inc. v. Ulloa, 958 F.2d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Chick Kam Choo, 486
U.S. at 148); see also Martinez, supra note 266, at 661-62.
276. 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 249, § 4426, at 111-12.
preclusion. According to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
for example, “[i]t is insufficient that a claim or issue could have
been raised in the prior action: The relitigation exception requires
that the claims or issues that the federal injunction is to insulate
from litigation in state proceedings ‘actually have been decided by
the federal court.’”272 The Second and Sixth Circuits have also read
the exception narrowly.273 According to Professor Tobias Barrington
Wolff, “this narrow approach expresses deference to the countervail-
ing federalism interest according to which class members should
rely upon the good faith of state courts to recognize appropriate
defenses of merger or bar.”274
Not all federal courts have adopted this narrow reading of the
relitigation exception. For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals has concluded that such a narrow reading of the relit-
igation exception 
would in essence ... read res judicata entirely out of section 2283.
Any issue which was ‘actually litigated’ by the parties in a prior
proceeding will be barred by collateral estoppel ..., without any
need to rely on res judicata .... This result seems ... to be
contrary to the purposes of section 2283 ... [and] contrary to the
language of Choo, which would bar relitigation of “claims or
issues [that] actually have been decided.”275
Some commentators also appear to reject the narrow reading.276
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277. See Prudential I, 261 F.3d 355, 366 (3d Cir. 2001).
278. Id.; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1996)
(concluding that the Full Faith and Credit statute applies to a state court judgment
incorporating a settlement that releases claims within the federal courts’ exclusive
jurisdiction, which were not, and could not have been, adjudicated by the state court); Grimes
v. Vitalink Commc’ns Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1563 (3d Cir. 1994); TBK Partners, Ltd. v. W.
Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 460 (2d Cir. 1982).
279. Prudential I, 261 F.3d at 366-67 (concluding that the release incorporated into the
judgment “has both claim preclusive and issue preclusive effect ... [and] precludes class
members from relying upon the common nucleus of operative facts underlying claims on the
Class Policies to fashion a separate remedy against Prudential outside the confines of the
Released Claims”).
280. 261 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2001).
281. See id. at 366-69.
282. Id. at 358-60.
283. Id. at 360.
284. Id. at 361.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has applied the Ninth
Circuit’s broader reasoning in the class action context.277 Building
on the proposition “that a judgment pursuant to a class settlement
can bar later claims based on the allegations underlying the claims
in the settled class action ... even though the precluded claim was
not presented, and could not have been presented, in the class
action itself,”278 the Third Circuit has held that the relitigation
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act permits federal courts to enjoin
litigation of claims that were released as part of a class action
settlement even though they were not actually litigated.279 The
Third Circuit went further in In re Prudential Insurance Company
of America Sales Practice Litigation (Prudential I),280 invoking the
relitigation exception to bar opt-out plaintiffs from bringing claims
that they clearly had preserved.281 This section first explores the
overbreadth complication before considering the relitigation
exception’s underinclusiveness.
In Prudential I, a federal district court settled a nationwide class
action that alleged deceptive sales practices by the Prudential
Insurance Company.282 Class members who had more than one
covered policy were afforded the opportunity to opt out regarding
some policies and to remain in the class regarding others.283
Invoking this option, Marvin and Alice Lowe opted out regarding
two insurance policies and remained in the class regarding two
others.284 Following settlement in federal court of the nationwide
class action and issuance of a federal injunction barring class mem-
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285. Id.
286. Id. at 361-63.
287. Id. at 363.
288. Id. at 365 (quoting the district court order).
289. Id. at 368.
290. Id.
bers from commencing or maintaining suits against Prudential
based on the facts underlying the class claims unless they opted
out, the Lowes filed suit in state court, alleging violations of various
laws regarding the two excluded policies.285 Although they sought
damages for only the excluded policies, their complaint alleged
facts regarding the policies covered by the class action purport-
edly because those facts were relevant to the claims on the
excluded policies and supported their claim for punitive damages.286
Prudential returned to the federal district court that had approved
the settlement and had issued the injunction, asking it to enjoin the
Lowes from taking discovery or undertaking any other action that
related to the facts and circumstances underlying the transactions
released in the class action.287 The district court enforced its in-
junction, concluding that “allowing the Lowes to use evidence of
sales practices and patterns relating to the Class Policies in their
state action on the Excluded Policies ‘would impair the finality of
the class settlement to an unacceptable degree’ and would effec-
tively permit ‘the relitigation of the released claims.’”288
On appeal, the Lowes argued that the injunction precluded them
from pursuing their claims on the excluded policies and “render[ed]
meaningless” and illusory their right to opt out regarding some but
not all policies.289 Recognizing that this argument was “not without
force,” the Third Circuit nevertheless upheld the injunction,
concluding that it “only prevents them from using evidence common
to the purchase and sale of their Class Policies and their Excluded
Policies in their state action on their Excluded Policies. It does not
prohibit them from pursuing any and all claims on the Excluded
Policies in the state court ....”290 In a tacit acknowledgment that the
right to pursue the excluded claims could be quite limited if the
class members were barred from using evidence relevant to the
released claims, the court suggested that:
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291. Id. at 369 n.8.
292. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
293. See Diet Drugs II, 369 F.3d 293, 306 (3d Cir. 2004).
294. See id. (stating that “under the settlement agreement opt-outs’ settled claims do not
go to judgment”). Of course, the Settlement Agreement not only precluded downstream opt-
out plaintiffs from seeking punitive damages, but it also precluded them from presenting
certain claims outside the confines of the federal class action. See supra notes 52, 56-57, 61-
62 and accompanying text. In at least one instance, the federal district court that approved
the settlement enjoined a plaintiff who sued in state court on a preserved claim from seeking
to offer evidence that allegedly supported a released claim. See PTO 2867, supra note 75.
295. Diet Drugs II, 369 F.3d at 306.
In the future, ... it may be advisable for district courts to
consider adding more specific language to settlement documents
... [to] advise class members that, even though they retain
certain claims as to transactions excluded from a settlement,
their ability to pursue those claims may be hindered by the
terms of the release of claims that remain part of any class
settlement.291 
Thus, the court read the relitigation exception to permit a federal
injunction against the prosecution of claims that the opt-out
plaintiffs clearly had preserved.
Given this broad reading of the relitigation exception, one
might have expected the Third Circuit to have relied on it in the
fen-phen litigation. In that case, the downstream opt-out plaintiffs,
who were denied the opportunity to seek punitive damages under
the Settlement Agreement, nevertheless sought to offer proof of
malicious conduct and other evidence that might have supported a
claim for punitive damages in state court proceedings.292 Surpris-
ingly, the Third Circuit did not rely on the relitigation exception to
uphold the district court’s injunction.293 Instead, it noted that the
fen-phen Settlement Agreement did not purport to preclude the
opt-out plaintiffs’ claims; to the contrary, it preserved them.294
Because the Settlement Agreement limited only the types of
damages that downstream opt-out plaintiffs could seek, “the
District Court had to enforce a damages preclusion, not a claim
preclusion. This was obviously more complicated because permitted
claims could give rise to both allowable compensatory damages and
forbidden punitive damages.”295 In light of the preservation of the
claims of the downstream opt-out plaintiffs, the Third Circuit
concluded that “the concepts of issue and claim preclusion are not
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296. Id.
297. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000). See generally 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 249, § 4225;
Wood, supra note 259, at 301-04.
298. See Toucey v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 134-36 (1941); Kline v. Burke Constr.
Co., 260 U.S. 226, 229 (1922); United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 174 F.3d 1007,
1014 (9th Cir. 1999); 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 249, § 4225, at 91-93. The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the argument that a punitive damages award sought
by a class qualified as a limited fund sufficiently analogous to a res to support an injunction
under this exception. In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1182 (8th Cir. 1982).
299. See, e.g., Battle v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 877, 881 (11th Cir. 1989).
300. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 295 (1970); see
also In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 144
(3d Cir. 1998); Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 202 (3d Cir. 1993); In re
Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 335 (2d Cir. 1985) (interpreting the All Writs Act); 17A
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 249, § 4225, at 94.
entirely apposite here” and declined to determine “whether the
District Court had the authority to effectuate the settlement agree-
ment’s punitive damages provision under the Anti-Injunction Act’s
relitigation exception.”296 Note, however, that the under-inclusive-
ness of the relitigation exception in this context derived less from
federalism concerns or a narrow reading of the relitigation excep-
tion, and more from a narrow reading of preclusion doctrine. In fact,
as the next section demonstrates, the Third Circuit upheld injunc-
tions against the opt-out plaintiffs under the “in aid of its jurisdic-
tion” exception.
3. “In Aid of Its Jurisdiction” Exception
The Anti-Injunction Act permits a federal court to enjoin a
pending state court action if the injunction is “necessary in aid of
its jurisdiction.”297 The classic use of this exception involves an
injunction issued by a federal court exercising in rem or quasi-in-
rem jurisdiction against subsequently filed state court actions
regarding the same res.298 Use of the “in aid of jurisdiction” ex-
ception is not limited, however, to in rem proceedings when the
federal court acquires jurisdiction over a res.299 Beyond this context,
the Court has held that the “in aid of jurisdiction” exception may be
invoked “to prevent a state court from so interfering with a federal
court’s consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair
the federal court’s flexibility and authority to decide that case.”300
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301. See Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 641-42 (1977) (plurality opinion);
Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466 (1939); In re Baldwin-
United, 770 F.2d at 336; In re Glenn W. Turner Enters. Litig., 521 F.2d 775, 780 (3d Cir.
1975); In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., No. 83-0268, 1991 WL 61156, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1991),
aff’d, 950 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1991). For powerful critiques of the courts’ narrow interpretation
of this exception, see, for example, Redish, supra note 260, at 1358-61 (criticizing the narrow
reading and proposing a “zero tolerance” model, which would permit no parallel proceedings
in state and federal court); Wolff, supra note 157 (manuscript at 11-14) (criticizing a strict
interpretation of the “in aid of jurisdiction” exception; advocating a more active inquiry into
the congressional purposes underlying targeted jurisdictional grants and an effort to
administer the “in aid of jurisdiction” exception with “explicit reference to those
congressional policies”).
302. Standard Microsys. Corp. v. Tex. Instruments Inc., 916 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1990); see,
e.g., Diet Drugs II, 369 F.3d 293, 306 (3d Cir. 2004); Carlough, 10 F.3d at 204 (finding it
“difficult to imagine a more detrimental effect upon the district court’s ability to effectuate
the settlement ... than would occur if the ... state court was permitted to make a
determination regarding the validity of the federal settlement”); In re Baldwin-United, 770
F.2d at 337 (upholding an injunction against state court actions that would “frustrate the
district court’s efforts to craft a settlement in the multidistrict litigation before it”); In re
Asbestos Sch. Litig., 1991 WL 61156, at *2 (stating that “this court’s ability to oversee a
possible settlement would be ‘seriously impaired’ by the continuing litigation of parallel state
actions”), aff’d, 950 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1991); cf. In re Gen. Motors, 134 F.3d at 144-45.
303. Diet Drugs I, 282 F.3d 220, 235 (3d Cir. 2002).
304. 770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1985).
305. Id. at 333.
Although the mere pendency of a parallel in personam action has
not itself been viewed as a sufficient threat to a federal court’s
jurisdiction to support an injunction under the “in aid of jurisdic-
tion” exception,301 some courts have concluded that such a threat
may exist “where a federal court is on the verge of settling a
complex matter, and state court proceedings may undermine its
ability to achieve that objective.”302 This threat is heightened when
the federal action “involves a substantial class of persons from
multiple states, or represents a consolidation of cases from multiple
districts.”303 For example, in In re Baldwin-United,304 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an injunction entered by a federal
district court that was on the verge of settling consolidated
multidistrict class actions. When the district court learned that
several state attorneys general were contemplating suits against
the class action defendants that would have sought additional relief
on behalf of members of the class, the district court enjoined the
states from filing suits on behalf of, or derivative of the rights of,
the class members that were to be released as part of the settle-
ment.305 In upholding the injunction, the Second Circuit noted:
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306. Id. at 337 (quoting Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 286,
295 (1970)).
307. Diet Drugs I, 282 F.2d at 236; see also Diet Drugs II, 369 F.3d at 306; Prudential I,
261 F.3d 355, 365 (3d Cir. 2001); Carlough, 10 F.3d at 201-04; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.42 (2004) (discussing authority to enjoin a related state case “if
settlement in the certified federal class action is completed or imminent and the need to
protect the class settlement is shown”) [hereinafter MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION]; Kerr,
supra note 209, at 247-50 (analyzing the Third Circuit’s approach to the “in aid of
jurisdiction” exception); cf. Ret. Sys. of Ala. v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 386 F.3d 419, 421
(2d Cir. 2004) (holding “that the ‘necessary in aid of its jurisdiction’ exception ... does not
permit a district court—even a district court managing complex, multidistrict litigation ...
—to enjoin state court proceedings simply to preserve its trial date”).
308. See Diet Drugs I, 282 F.3d at 234-39; Carlough, 10 F.3d at 201-04.
309. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000); see supra Part IV.B.2.
[T]he potential for an onslaught of state actions ... threatened to
“seriously impair the federal court’s flexibility and authority” to
approve settlements in the multi-district litigation.... In effect,
... the district court had before it a class action proceeding so far
advanced that it was the virtual equivalent of a res over which
the district judge required full control.306
The Third Circuit, too, has highlighted the special challenges
in these circumstances: “[i]n complex cases where certification
or settlement has received conditional approval, or perhaps even
where settlement is pending, the challenges facing the overseeing
court are such that it is likely that almost any parallel litigation in
other fora presents a genuine threat to the jurisdiction of the
federal court.”307 In at least two cases, the Third Circuit has invoked
the “in aid of jurisdiction” exception to enjoin class members from
employing parallel state class actions to secure mass opt-outs from
consolidated federal class actions.308
Although one can understand why an injunction against state
court litigation might be necessary to protect the jurisdiction of a
federal court entertaining a complex case on the verge of settle-
ment, it is less obvious whether this exception would permit an
injunction after the court entered a final judgment and absent class
members then sought to exercise downstream opt-out rights. One
might think that once a federal court has issued a final judgment
approving a settlement, it would rely exclusively on the relitigation
exception.309 In fact, the Ninth Circuit held that a district court that
entered a final judgment approving a class action settlement and
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310. Sandpiper Vill. Condo. Ass’n v. La.-Pac. Corp., 428 F.3d 831, 844-46 (9th Cir. 2005),
cert. denied sub nom., La.-Pac. Corp. v. Lester Bldg. Sys., 126 S. Ct. 2970 (2006); cf. Hoffman,
Syngenta, supra note 97, at 638-39 (questioning whether the scope of federal injunctive
authority depends upon timing).
311. See, e.g., Diet Drugs II, 369 F.3d at 306; Prudential I, 261 F.3d at 367-68; United
States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 174 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 1999); Battle v. Liberty
Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 877, 881 (11th Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 907 F.2d 277, 280 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding an injunction issued pursuant to the
All Writs Act “as a necessary means of protecting the district court’s jurisdiction over
implementation of the Consent Decree”).
312. See, e.g., Prudential I, 261 F.3d at 367-68; In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 996
F.2d 1425, 1432 (2d Cir. 1993); Battle, 877 F.2d at 881; In re Corrugated Container Antitrust
Litig., 659 F.2d 1332, 1334 (5th Cir. 1991) (concluding that state court actions pressing
claims related to those settled in the federal class action “would be a challenge to [the federal
court’s] jurisdiction”); see also Winkler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 101 F.3d 1196, 1202-03 (7th Cir.
1996) (concluding that the Anti-Injunction Act did not deprive a federal court of authority to
enjoin state court litigants from seeking discovery of a document that the federal court
already had concluded was not discoverable). 
313. Diet Drugs II, 369 F.3d at 306.
had only to “ensure that the terms of the settlement agreement
[were] followed” lacked authority under the “in aid of its jurisdic-
tion” exception to enjoin state court actions that sought relief
arguably precluded by the judgment.310
Not all courts agree, however. A number of federal courts have
invoked the “in aid of jurisdiction” exception even after approval
of a final settlement.311 In their view, when a judicially approved
settlement bars absent class members from bringing certain claims
or seeking certain types of damages, and some class members then
file state court actions presenting claims that arguably were
covered by the settlement or damages that arguably were forbidden
by the settlement, a federal district court that expressly retained
jurisdiction to administer and supervise the settlement may issue
an injunction to enforce its terms.312 As the Third Circuit explained
in the fen-phen litigation: 
[T]he punitive damages release is a central pillar of the settle-
ment agreement. Allowing state court actions to run afoul of
that provision would fatally subvert it and render the agreement
(and the Court’s jurisdiction) nugatory. The District Court’s
ability to give effect to that provision is necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction.313
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314. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat. 4, 4-5 (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
315. Id. §§ 4-5.
316. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
317. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (2000).
318. Wolff, supra note 157 (manuscript at 26-27).
319. Id. (manuscript at 8); see also Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L.
REV. 461, 511-15, 530-31 (2000).
320. Wolff, supra note 157 (manuscript at 27); see also id. (manuscript at 26) (stating that
“when absent class members and competing counsel file suit in federal court and seek to
enjoin what they believe to be a collusive state-court proceeding, they are invoking the
jurisdiction of the federal court for the very purpose for which it was created. An antisuit
CAFA does not strengthen the case for federal injunctions against
violations of the limits built into back-end opt-out rights. CAFA
reflects a Congressional judgment that federal courts are better
able to oversee nationwide class actions and to guard against
potential collusion between class counsel and the defendant.314 To
ensure that more nationwide class actions are heard by federal
courts, Congress enlarged both the original and removal jurisdiction
of the federal courts;315 at the same time, it declined to expressly
authorize injunctions against either competing state court class
actions or individual suits filed by back-end opt-out plaintiffs.316
Because, in the interpleader context, Congress explicitly authorized
the district courts to issue injunctions deemed necessary to support
a new grant of federal jurisdiction,317 one might conclude that in
enacting CAFA, Congress made an apparent choice not to authorize
injunctions against pending state court actions and to rely instead
on the enlargement of federal jurisdiction.
Professor Wolff has argued that even though CAFA does not
explicitly authorize federal injunctions, it should be read to permit
injunctions against the type of collusive state court class actions
that CAFA was designed to prevent.318 In his view, “in aid of” the
targeted and specialized grant of jurisdiction extended by CAFA,
federal courts may enjoin dueling state class actions “that exhibit
indicia of the malfeasance or collusion that the statute was
designed to combat.”319 In other words, in interpreting and applying
the “in aid of jurisdiction” exception, federal courts should consider
the policies underlying targeted grants of jurisdiction like CAFA,
which may support federal injunctions against “the type of harm
that the Act’s jurisdictional provision was designed to prevent—a
state proceeding tainted by collusion or malfeasance.”320
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injunction in such a case operates directly in aid of the federal court’s exercise of protective
jurisdiction.”).
321. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 3(a), 119 Stat. 4, 5-9 (codified
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
Although Wolff convincingly argues that CAFA should inform the
scope of federal authority to enjoin dueling class actions, his
analysis does not support broader authority to enjoin back-end opt-
out plaintiffs. Whereas Congress was concerned with collusive class
action settlements, coupon settlements, excessive attorneys’ fees,
and discrimination among class members based on geographic
location,321 it expressed no concern over individual suits filed by
back-end opt-out plaintiffs and the risks they might pose to
comprehensive settlements reached in federal court. Thus, although
CAFA may shift large numbers of class actions into federal court
and increase the demand for federal injunctions against state
litigation filed by back-end opt-out plaintiffs, it does not contem-
plate injunctions against violations of the limits built into back-end
opt-out rights nor alleviate the federalism complications that arise
in connection with back-end opt-out rights.
To minimize the complications that may arise under the Anti-
Injunction Act when a federal court seeks to enjoin back-end opt-out
plaintiffs from seeking relief in state courts, federal courts that
approve class action settlements should take three steps. First, they
should issue an injunction against state suits that present claims
covered by the settlement agreement or seek damages barred by the
settlement agreement before any such state suits are filed, thereby
bypassing the Anti-Injunction Act. Second, they should retain
continuing jurisdiction to supervise and enforce the settlement,
which will strengthen the argument that an injunction is necessary
in aid of the court’s jurisdiction. Third, they (and the attorneys
representing the parties in federal class actions) should seek to
ensure that settlement agreements and notices sent to absent class
members are more explicit about the risks faced by those who
preserve limited opportunities to opt out after the initial (full) opt-
out period expires. In particular, if some claims are preserved but
other factually related claims are released, the settlement agree-
ment should explicitly delineate the extent to which the opportunity
to prove the preserved claim may be hampered by the preclusive
effect of the release.
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322. 401 U.S. 37 (1971); see generally Ann Althouse, The Misguided Search for State
Interest in Abstention Cases: Observations on the Occasion of Pennzoil v. Texaco, 63 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1051, 1086-87, 1090  (1988) (arguing that the focus in Younger abstention should be
on the federal interest in “maximizing federal law enforcement through the effective and
efficient use of our parallel judicial systems,” rather than on state interests); Martin H.
Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63 CORNELL
L. REV. 463, 465-66, 477, 482 (1978) (delineating four theoretical rationales for Younger
abstention and concluding that none of them justifies the Younger doctrine’s “sweeping
limitation on federal judicial authority”); Wood, supra note 259, at 293-94. For a review of
the different types of abstention and a more thorough discussion of Younger abstention, see
17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 249, § 4241; 17B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 4251-4255 (3d ed. 2007).
323. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. The Younger doctrine allows federal intervention when “the state proceeding is
motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith,” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
U.S. 592, 611 (1975), or in other extraordinary circumstances. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415,
432-33 (1979); see also Younger, 401 U.S. at 47-49, 53; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,
483-85 (1965); 17B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 322, § 4251, at 12, § 4255.
327. Younger, 401 U.S. at 46; accord Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 133 (2004).
328. See, e.g., Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 129-31 (1975); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S.
82, 84 (1971); see also Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951); 17B WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 322, § 4252, at 18.
C. Younger Abstention
In Younger v. Harris,322 the Supreme Court held that a federal
district court erred when it enjoined a criminal prosecution pending
in state court. Recognizing that federal courts owe state courts and
their functions “proper respect,”323 the Court articulated the belief
that “the National Government will fare best if the States and their
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their
separate ways.”324 Comity and federalism concerns thus require the
federal government to strive to protect federal rights without
“unduly interfer[ing] with the legitimate activities of the States.”325
A federal court ordinarily should abstain from enjoining a state
criminal prosecution filed in good faith326 when the defendant can
challenge the constitutionality of the statute she is charged with
violating in the context of the state court action.327 In later cases,
the Court held that the Younger abstention doctrine not only barred
federal injunctions against state criminal prosecutions, but also
barred federal intervention to suppress the use in state court of
evidence that allegedly had been seized through unlawful means.328
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
442 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:373
329. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) (stating that Younger
abstention is mandated “not only when the pending state proceedings are criminal, but also
when certain civil proceedings are pending, if the State’s interests in the proceeding are so
important that exercise of the federal judicial power would disregard the comity between the
States and the National Government”); Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schs.,
Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627 (1986) (observing that Younger abstention “applied ... to state
administrative proceedings in which important state interests are vindicated”); Middlesex
County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 425, 437 (1982) (holding that
“a federal court should abstain from considering a challenge to the constitutionality of
disciplinary rules that are the subject of pending state disciplinary proceedings”); Moore, 442
U.S. at 423 (applying Younger abstention where the state was a party to the state
proceedings and “the temporary removal of a child in a child-abuse context is ... ‘in aid of and
closely related to criminal statutes’”) (citation omitted); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434,
444 (1977) (applying Younger abstention to civil litigation commenced by the state in its
sovereign capacity to recover welfare payments); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 334, 337
(1977) (applying Younger abstention to state contempt proceedings); Huffman, 420 U.S. at
594, 604-05, 607 (applying Younger abstention to a state nuisance action commenced by the
state “in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes” barring the dissemination of obscene
materials); see also 17B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 322, § 4254; cf. New Orleans Pub. Serv.,
Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 370, 373 (1989) (declining to apply Younger
abstention to “a state court challenge to completed legislative action” because Younger
applies only to proceedings that are “judicial in nature”).
330. New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 365.
331. See, e.g., Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 12-14 (concluding that the state had an important
interest in the enforcement of its money judgments).
332. 430 U.S. 327 (1977); see also 17B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 322, § 4254, at 74-76.
Even beyond the criminal context, the Supreme Court has held
that the Younger abstention doctrine applies to civil state court
proceedings as long as important state interests are at stake and
the state proceeding affords an adequate legal remedy.329 In deter-
mining whether the state has a substantial interest, the Court
does “not look narrowly to its interest in the outcome of the
particular case—which could arguably be offset by a substantial
federal interest in the opposite outcome. Rather, what [the Court]
look[s] to is the importance of the generic proceedings to the
State.”330
Even where the state is not a party to the state court proceeding
(as it is in criminal cases), it may have an important enough
interest in administering its judicial system to support Younger
abstention.331 For example, in Juidice v. Vail,332 a state court
rendered a default judgment against Harry Vail, who had defaulted
on a credit arrangement with a private lender. When Vail failed to
satisfy the judgment and ignored a subpoena ordering him to attend
a post-judgment deposition, the state court judge ordered him to
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333. Juidice, 430 U.S. at 329.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 329-30.
336. Id. at 330.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 335.
339. Id. (citations omitted).
340. Id.
341. 481 U.S. 1 (1987); see also Althouse, supra note 322, at 1054-82; 17B WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 322, § 4254, at 82-91.
342. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 11-12. Such concerns may support Pullman abstention. See R.R.
Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941); 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 249, §
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.333 When
Vail did not attend the hearing, the judge held him in contempt
and ordered him to pay a fine.334 When Vail failed to pay the
fine, the judge had him arrested.335 After his release from jail, Vail
commenced a federal lawsuit on behalf of himself and a class of
judgment debtors, challenging the constitutionality of the state’s
statutory contempt procedures.336 Noting that Vail’s constitutional
challenge “could have been raised ... in the state courts, as a
defense to the ongoing proceedings,”337 the Supreme Court held that
the federal court should have abstained out of respect for the
“State’s interest in the contempt process, through which it vindi-
cates the regular operation of its judicial system.”338 Although
recognizing that the state’s interest in its contempt process is
“[p]erhaps ... not quite as important as ... the State’s interest in the
enforcement of its criminal laws, or even its interest in the mainte-
nance of a quasi-criminal proceeding such as was involved in
Huffman,”339 the Court nevertheless concluded that “it is of
sufficiently great import to require application of the principles of
those cases. The contempt power lies at the core of the administra-
tion of a State’s judicial system.”340
In Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco,341 the Supreme Court held, in the
context of a contract dispute between two private corporations, that
a federal court should not have enjoined Pennzoil from seeking to
enforce its state court judgment against Texaco. The Court reached
its conclusion because a decision by the state court on the validity
of its judgment enforcement procedures might have been resolved
on state statutory or state constitutional grounds without the need
to reach the federal constitutional issues that Texaco raised in
federal court342 and out of respect for the state’s interest in the
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
444 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:373
4242, at 320-21 (stating that “a federal court may, and ordinarily should, refrain from
deciding a case in which state action is challenged in federal court as contrary to the federal
constitution if there are unsettled questions of state law that may be dispositive of the case
and avoid the need for deciding the constitutional question”). The Pennzoil Court declined
to consider Pullman abstention because Pennzoil had not argued it to the Court, but noted
“that considerations similar to those that mandate Pullman abstention are relevant to a
court’s decision whether to abstain under Younger.” Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 11 n.9.
343. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 10-11.
344. Id. at 13-14; cf. Althouse, supra note 322, at 1080-82 (suggesting that the state in
Juidice had a strong interest in its contempt power whereas the state in Pennzoil had a more
neutral and muted interest in providing a judicial forum for private litigants).
345. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1992).
346. It is possible that the Younger doctrine supports abstention only where the federal
court is called upon to review the constitutionality of state action. See infra notes 348-51 and
accompanying text.
enforcement of its judgments.343 Comparing the case to Juidice, the
Court stated: 
There is little difference between the State’s interest in forcing
persons to transfer property in response to a court’s judgment
and in forcing persons to respond to the court’s process on pain
of contempt. Both Juidice and this case involve challenges to the
processes by which the State compels compliance with the
judgments of its courts.344
Case law therefore suggests that in deciding whether to abstain
from enjoining a state court action filed by an absent class member
exercising a limited back-end opt-out right that arguably seeks
relief barred by a judicially-approved settlement agreement, a
federal court must consider three issues: “first, do[es] [the state
court action] constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding; second,
do the [state] proceedings implicate important state interests; and
third, is there an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to
raise constitutional challenges.”345
The first and third conditions are obviously met. The action filed
by the opt-out plaintiff in state court is clearly an “ongoing state
judicial proceeding.” Moreover, the defendant who asks the federal
court to enjoin the state court action to prevent violations of the
settlement agreement approved by the federal court has the
opportunity to ask the state court to recognize the federal judgment
and to enforce the limits inherent in the back-end opt-out right.346
Thus, the appropriateness of Younger abstention in these circum-
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347. Diet Drugs II, 369 F.3d 293, 307 n.6 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
348. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 11-12; Shepherd Intelligence Sys., Inc. v. Def. Techs., Inc., 702
F. Supp. 365, 367 n.3 (D. Mass. 1988) (declining to abstain in the absence of a federal
constitutional issue); 17B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 322, § 4251, at 1; cf. Hoai v. Sun Ref.
& Mktg. Co., 866 F.2d 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (concluding that abstention was inappropriate
in a federal case that failed to raise a federal constitutional issue, but not raising that point
in support of the holding); Redish, supra note 322, at 481 n.94 (suggesting, before Pennzoil,
that “[i]f Younger were extended to civil cases involving private parties, it is not clear
whether the doctrine would still be limited to § 1983 suits or would apply to any asserted
basis for federal injunctive relief”).
349. See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
350. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 11 n.9.
351. 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 249, § 4242, at 325-26; cf. Druker v. Sullivan, 458 F.2d
1272, 1274 (1st Cir. 1972) (stating that “[w]hile ordinarily the federal claims in abstention
cases have been purely constitutional ones, the same policies are applicable where ... the
stances turns on the remaining condition—the existence of an
important state interest in administering its own judicial processes
without federal court interference.
The Third Circuit in the fen-phen case summarily concluded that
this condition was not met: 
We discern nothing about the state civil proceedings at issue
here—personal injury suits sounding largely in state tort
law—that can fairly be thought to implicate “important state
interests.” The instances where the Supreme Court ... ha[s]
applied Younger to state civil proceedings—such as state
contempt proceedings [and] judicial proceedings enforcing state
court orders ... —involved proceedings qualitatively different
from those at issue here.347
The Third Circuit might have bolstered its conclusion that
Younger abstention was not mandated by adding that federal
restraint typically is required only in deciding federal constitu-
tional challenges to state action.348 As the Supreme Court noted
in Pennzoil, in cases challenging state law or practice on federal
constitutional grounds, abstention affords the state court an oppor-
tunity to resolve unsettled state law questions that may render
resolution of the federal constitutional issue unnecessary.349 These
“considerations [are] similar to those that mandate Pullman
abstention,”350 which applies only when resolution of an unsettled
state law question might avoid the need to decide a federal
constitutional issue, not a federal statutory issue.351 In a case like
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federal claim is in part statutory”).
352. Althouse, supra note 322, at 1053, 1084-90.
353. Id. at 1088.
354. This is especially true if state law governs the interpretation of the settlement
agreement, as it likely will if the agreement settles state law claims. Michael E. Solimine,
Enforcement and Interpretation of Settlements of Federal Civil Rights Actions, 19 RUTGERS
L.J. 295, 318 (1988). If, on the other hand, the agreement settles federal claims, federal
common law may govern the interpretive questions, Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General
Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 526-30 (2006); Solimine, supra at 319, and at least there would
be an argument that state courts should be afforded the opportunity to develop an expertise
in this body of federal common law.
fen-phen, which raised no federal constitutional challenge to a state
law or practice and interpreted no federal statute, abstention would
not avoid the potentially unnecessary resolution of federal constitu-
tional, or even statutory, issues.
On a related note, as Professor Ann Althouse has argued, it may
be that Younger abstention should be invoked to maximize the
enforcement of federal law by permitting state courts to develop
familiarity and expertise in federal law, rather than to serve state
interests.352 If Younger is so understood, the case for abstention may
be weak in the back-end opt-out context irrespective of the state
interest. Permitting a state court to interpret a settlement agree-
ment approved by a federal court and to determine whether
evidence that a plaintiff seeks to introduce will flout the restrictions
built into a limited back-end opt-out right likely will not serve
“[l]ong-term federal interests in promoting a strong and capable
parallel system of courts”353 to enforce federal constitutional (or
even statutory) law. Put differently, permitting a state court to
interpret one federally-approved settlement agreement will not help
it develop familiarity or expertise in federal law or even help it
interpret another settlement agreement approved by a different
federal court in another class action.354 Viewed through this lens,
the case for federal abstention is weak.
Although these arguments bolster the Third Circuit’s conclusion
that Younger abstention is not mandated when a federal court is
asked to enjoin a state court proceeding to ensure that a judicially-
approved settlement agreement is properly interpreted and applied,
the question is more complicated than the Third Circuit suggested.
First, given the Supreme Court’s decisions in Pennzoil and Juidice,
the fact that the fen-phen case was a civil action between private
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355. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 39-41 (1971).
356. See, e.g., Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 129-31 (1975); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.
488, 499-500 (1974); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 84-85 (1971); see also Stefanelli v.
Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951).
357. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
358. Id. at 500 (citation omitted); see also Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887
F.2d 49, 53 (4th Cir. 1989).
359. Cf. Redish, supra note 322, at 477-80 (rejecting a state’s substantive legislative goals
as an appropriate consideration in Younger abstention).
litigants clearly is not dispositive. Even in civil litigation between
private parties, states may have important interests in enforcing
their judgments that may support federal abstention.
Second, although the actions initiated by the opt-out plaintiffs in
state court had not yet gone to judgment and therefore the states
involved could not claim an interest in the enforcement of their
judgments, states may have important interests in judicial
independence and the integrity of their judicial processes even
before judgment is rendered. After all, Younger itself involved
federal interference with a pending state criminal prosecution that
had not yet gone to judgment.355 In other cases, too, the Court has
barred federal intervention in pre-judgment state criminal prosecu-
tions.356 In O’Shea v. Littleton,357 for example, the federal plaintiffs
sought to enjoin a county court magistrate and judge from engaging
in racial discrimination in connection with the setting of bonds and
sentencing in prospective prosecutions. The Court noted that “the
[federal] order would contemplate interruption of state proceedings
to adjudicate assertions of noncompliance by [the county magis-
trate and judge]. This seems to us nothing less than an ongoing
federal audit of state criminal proceedings which would indirectly
accomplish the kind of interference that [Younger] ... sought to
prevent.”358
As the Third Circuit’s opinion in Diet Drugs II suggests, it may
be that although a state’s substantive interest in its criminal laws
is sufficient to support Younger abstention even before a state
prosecution has gone to judgment, its interest in civil litigation
between private parties is not sufficiently important for Younger
purposes until its courts invest the time and resources necessary to
produce a judgment.359 In an earlier suit, the Third Circuit sug-
gested as much: 
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360. Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 109 (3d Cir. 1989) (relying in part on Williams v. Red
Bank Bd. of Educ., 662 F.2d 1008, 1019 (3d Cir. 1981)).
361. 959 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1992).
362. Id. at 634.
363. Id. at 634-35.
364. Id. at 636-37.
365. Id. at 636.
366. Id.
[T]he ... principle that the state’s interest in litigation initiated
by private persons is less weighty than other state interests
protected by Younger may still have some room to operate, as it
suggests that the federal courts may, in an appropriate case,
interfere with an ongoing privately initiated state proceeding in
which the state court has not yet rendered judgment even if
Younger would preclude such interference in a case in which the
state had already entered a judgment.360
But this conclusion is neither obvious nor necessarily correct.
State courts may have a powerful interest in overseeing and admin-
istering civil litigation without federal interference. Although
this interest does not derive from a substantive interest in state
criminal laws or an interest in having state civil judgments rec-
ognized and enforced, it nevertheless may be sufficiently important
to support Younger abstention. For example, in Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp. v. Moran,361 the plaintiffs filed a civil action in an
Illinois state court and, consistent with an Illinois state rule,
provided notice that they expected four of the corporate defendant’s
nonresident employees to appear at trial. The trial judge denied the
defendant’s motion to quash the notice for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion.362 The defendant then filed suit against the state trial judge in
federal court.363 On appeal from a dismissal of the federal action,
the Seventh Circuit relied upon Younger abstention to uphold the
dismissal even though the state court had not yet rendered a
judgment.364 Noting that the state-court defendant “wants the
federal court to consider a rule affecting the production of evidence
in court, the implementation (or disregard) of which affects the
outcome of the merits,”365 the Seventh Circuit concluded that “[i]t
would be absurd, an inversion of appropriate principles of federal-
ism, for this court to tell a state trial court in mid-trial what
evidence and sanctions are appropriate.”366 Other courts of appeals
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367. Anthony v. Council, 316 F.3d 412, 421 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Parker v. Turner, 626
F.2d 1, 8 (6th Cir. 1980) (upholding Younger abstention where the “relief which the plaintiffs
seek ... would necessarily require monitoring of the manner in which the state juvenile
judges conducted contempt hearings in non-support cases”).
368. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000); see also supra Part IV.B.2.
369. Redish, supra note 322, at 486; see also id. at 486 n.115 (suggesting that the
recommended analysis should “be applied exclusively to civil rights suits under § 1983”).
370. Martin H. Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 717,
755 (1977); cf. Redish, supra note 260, at 1371-72 (seeking to reconcile his advocacy of a
balancing approach with his later support for a “zero tolerance” model).
have expressed similar concern over the disruption that would be
caused if a federal court had to “monitor and enforce the state
courts’ compliance with a federal order.”367 The second condition for
Younger abstention thus may be satisfied in cases like fen-phen, in
which a party asks a federal court to enforce the limits on a back-
end opt-out right by monitoring the allegations that may be made
and the evidence that may be admitted in a pending state court
action.
Finally, even if the requisite state interest exists to support
Younger abstention, it may be appropriate for a federal court to
intervene to protect or effectuate its judgment (when the state court
has not yet entered a judgment). In other words, although the
Younger doctrine requires federal courts to abstain in certain cases
out of respect for the integrity of the state’s judicial processes (or to
maximize the enforcement of federal law), perhaps the Younger
doctrine should acknowledge a countervailing interest in the
enforcement of federal judgments, an interest already codified in
the third exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.368 Professor Martin
Redish has suggested that courts considering whether to abstain
under Younger “should balance, on a case-by-case basis, the danger
of disruption of state proceedings against the strength of the
individual’s need for immediate review by a federal tribunal.”369 In
the Anti-Injunction Act context, too, Professor Redish has advocated
an approach that would “balance evenly the interest of the state
courts in remaining free from collateral federal interference against
the importance of preserving the authority and integrity of the
federal court’s jurisdiction.”370 When a federal court is called upon
to enjoin the violation of a judicially-approved settlement agree-
ment by litigants in a pending state court proceeding, it may also
be appropriate to balance the state court’s interest in autonomy
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371. Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 151 (1988).
372. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972); see also Diet Drugs II, 369 F.3d 293, 306-
07 (3d Cir. 2004); 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 249, § 4226, at 127-29.
373. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971); see also Diet Drugs II, 369 F.3d
at 307; Wood, supra note 259, at 292 (stating that “equitable principles have a strong
restraining force on anti-suit injunctions”).
374. Temple Univ. v. White, 941 F.2d 201, 215 (3d Cir. 1991). Some scholars have
questioned the courts’ reliance in a merged system on certain equitable principles, which
were developed when equity and law were separate legal systems. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss,
Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1107 (1977); Redish, supra note 322, at 463-64 n.6; Ralph
U. Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interference with State Court Proceedings:
The Supreme Court and the Limits on Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C. L. REV. 591, 611-13 (1975).
375. Diet Drugs II, 369 F.3d at 307.
against the need to preserve the integrity of the federal judgment
and the settlement agreement that it approved.
V. EQUITABLE AND PRACTICAL COMPLICATIONS
As the Supreme Court has noted, “the fact that an injunction may
issue under the Anti-Injunction Act does not mean that it must
issue.”371 Thus, even if an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act is
available and even if the Younger doctrine does not mandate
abstention, the federal district court should consider “the principles
of equity [and] comity ... that must restrain a federal court when
asked to enjoin a state court proceeding.”372 Specifically, it should
not enjoin pending state proceedings unless the standard require-
ments for injunctive relief—a showing of irreparable harm and the
absence of an adequate remedy at law—are met.373 Practical con-
cerns may also counsel in favor of restraint. It is to these complica-
tions that Part V now turns.
A. Equity
Equitable relief may be no broader than necessary to remedy the
legal transgression established.374 When a federal court is asked to
enjoin a state court litigant from proceeding with her action or from
offering certain evidence in support of her claim, the court must
carefully tailor any injunction it issues and ensure that it is
“commensurate with the wrong it is crafted to remedy.”375
In deciding whether or not to uphold the injunction issued in the
fen-phen litigation to enjoin absent class members who exercised
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376. Id. at 308.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 309.
379. Id. at 310.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
limited back-end opt-out rights from offering certain evidence in
state court, the Third Circuit had to determine whether the
injunctions were necessary to enforce the terms of the Settlement
Agreement. “An over-inclusive injunction would run afoul of well-
established principles of equity and federalism.”376
The court focused on the terms of the class action notice sent to
absent class members and the Settlement Agreement, concluding
that “to avoid due process concerns,” the preclusion language had
to “be strictly construed against those who [sought] to restrict class
members from pursuing individual claims.”377 The court concluded
that three relevant restrictions emerged from a close reading. First,
those exercising intermediate opt-out rights would not be permitted
to sue for consumer fraud or business loss, but otherwise, they
could “‘pursue all ... Settled Claims’ for timely diagnosed VHD
[valvular heart disease].”378 Second, class members who exercised
intermediate opt-out rights could not seek “punitive, exemplary, or
any multiple damages.”379 Third, they could not introduce into
evidence any verdicts or judgments against Wyeth or any evidence
regarding the Settlement Agreement.380
Notably, although the opt-out plaintiffs were precluded from
offering certain kinds of evidence, such as evidence of judgments
against the company, they were not specifically precluded from
using evidence that supported a proper claim “simply because it
would [also] be relevant in supporting punitive damages.”381 In
other words, the Settlement Agreement did not specifically bar the
absent class members from offering evidence of intentional or
reckless behavior, which would have supported their claims for
negligence or defective design. “One deduces from the absence of
such an evidentiary restriction that the agreement meant only to
block the specified type of damages award and not types of evidence
that are relevant to permissible awards but might also be relevant
to punitive damages.”382 Even though evidence of intentional or
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383. Id. at 311-12.
384. Prudential I, 261 F.3d 355, 368 (3d Cir. 2001); see also supra notes 277-91 and
accompanying text.
385. Diet Drugs II, 369 F.3d at 311 (quoting Prudential I, 261 F.3d at 367) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
386. Prudential I, 261 F.3d at 365.
387. Diet Drugs II, 369 F.3d at 311 (quoting Prudential I, 261 F.3d at 367).
388. Id.
reckless behavior also would have supported punitive damages,
which the plaintiffs were precluded from seeking, the Third Circuit
declined to construe the Settlement Agreement as requiring that
very strong evidence of fault be “diluted so that it would not arouse
the jury to award punitive damages.”383
The court recognized that in its own decision in Prudential I, it
upheld an injunction that prevented absent class members who
opted out regarding some insurance policies but not others “from
using evidence common to the purchase and sale of their Class
Policies and their Excluded Policies in their state action on their
Excluded Policies.”384 In seeking to distinguish Prudential I, the fen-
phen court noted that the release in Prudential I was broad,
releasing the defendants “from any and all causes of action ... of any
kind or nature whatsoever ... that have been, or could have been,
may be or could be alleged or asserted now or in the future ... on the
basis of ... the Released Transactions [i.e., settled policies under the
settlement agreement].”385 Given the breadth of the release, which
precluded claims that were related in any way to a settled policy,
the Third Circuit in Prudential I upheld an injunction that barred
opt-out plaintiffs from using common evidence in support of their
preserved claims.386
Unlike the broad general release in Prudential I, which
“prevent[ed] new causes of action from overlapping with settled
causes of action with a ‘common nucleus of operative facts,’”387 the
Diet Drugs release was “a bar only to the magnitude and type of
relief.... VHD-based claims for compensation, including pain,
anguish, and loss of consortium, are not precluded or limited in any
way.... What is limited is the type and extent of damages for such
VHD-claims.”388 Given the equitable requirement that injunctive
relief be carefully tailored to remedy the violation found, the Third
Circuit declined to “read this punitive damages limitation as if it
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390. Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 248, 257 (2d Cir. 2001); In re “Agent Orange”
Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1431 (2d Cir. 1993) (concluding that the court “best
situated” to determine “the scope of the ... class action and settlement ... is the court that
approved the settlement and entered the judgment enforcing it”).
were a limit on the manner in which opt-out plaintiffs can pursue
their claims for compensation.”389
The lesson from equity for attorneys and trial courts involved in
class action settlements that afford limited back-end opt-out rights
is similar to one of the lessons gleaned from the analysis of the
Anti-Injunction Act: settlement agreements and notices sent to
absent class members must be clear and explicit about (a) both the
claims released and those retained by class members preserving
limited opportunities to opt out after the initial, full opt-out period
expires; (b) the restrictions, if any, on the types of damages that
those with back-end opt-out rights may seek; and (c) the extent to
which evidence that supports preserved claims but also would
support precluded claims or precluded types of damages may be
offered.
B. Practical Concerns
Even apart from the jurisdictional, federalism, and equitable
complications that may bedevil efforts by federal courts to enforce
the terms of judicially-approved settlement agreements against
state court litigants who exercise limited back-end opt-out rights,
practical and prudential considerations also exist.
First, while it likely would be better situated to interpret the
settlement agreement it approved and to ascertain the intent of the
parties in limiting back-end opt-out rights,390 the federal court that
oversaw the class action might not be well situated to make many
of the evidentiary decisions that would become necessary if the
back-end opt-out plaintiff sought to introduce evidence that the
defendant claimed was barred by the settlement agreement. For
example, if the settlement agreement precluded back-end opt-out
plaintiffs from seeking punitive damages, as it did in the fen-phen
case, the defendant would want to ensure that opt-out plaintiffs did
not circumvent this restriction by offering proof of the defendant’s
willful and wanton conduct or other evidence that would support a
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391. Diet Drugs II, 369 F.3d at 314.
392. Id.
393. Id. (quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 859 (3d Cir. 1990)).
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. See id.
398. Id. at 316.
399. Id.; see also Althouse, supra note 322, at 1053, 1062 (describing the benefit of having
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claim for punitive damages (even if the plaintiff’s complaint did
not seek punitive damages). Yet, if the evidence would support not
only a precluded claim for punitive damages but also a preserved
claim for compensatory damages, a court would have to determine
whether the evidence should be admitted.
In making this determination, the court would have to balance
the probative value of the evidence against the risk that it might
be “so inculpatory that it might inflame the jury to award
damages that would punish [the defendant] instead of simply
compensating the plaintiffs.”391 In the words of the Third Circuit in
Diet Drugs II, this balancing process is “nuanced and contextual”392
and needs to be performed as the plaintiff’s narrative unfolds at
trial with the benefit of a “full record,”393 and not “prematurely”394
and “[p]recipitous[ly]”395 in an “arid”396 pretrial hearing before a
federal judge who will not try the case.397 Thus, the federal judge’s
physical and temporal remove from the trial creates serious
practical complications.
Second, evidence properly excluded from the plaintiff’s case in
chief might nevertheless be admissible for purposes of rebuttal or
impeachment if the defendant were to “open the door” at trial. But
if a federal judge were to decide in a pretrial hearing that certain
exhibits or portions of testimony were “excluded definitively,” the
state trial court’s discretion to permit the previously excluded
evidence for rebuttal or impeachment purposes would be bounded
by the federal court’s order. The plaintiff would have to seek a
modification of the federal order, which necessarily would interrupt
the flow of the state court trial.398 Even if the plaintiff could seek
such a modification by telephone, the very need to call the federal
judge would be “awkward, ... highly intrusive and unworkable.”399
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Such interruptions would be far more disruptive if the federal judge
were not immediately available and the state trial had to recess
until she could be reached. Not only would the jurors, the parties,
their attorneys, and the state court judge waste valuable time, and
not only would the flow of the trial be interrupted, but presumably
the jury would question the authority of the state court judge to
oversee litigation pending in her own courtroom.
Third, a federal injunction might be so sweeping in scope or so
vague in its language that a state trial court would be unsure what
authority it retained to proceed. For example, in the Prudential
Insurance litigation, the federal court that approved the settlement
of a nationwide class action issued an injunction that enjoined class
members who opted out regarding some but not all of their
insurance policies “from engaging in motion practice, pursuing
discovery, presenting evidence or undertaking any other action in
furtherance [of their state court action] that is based on, relates to
or involves facts and circumstances underlying the Released
Transactions in the Class Action.”400 Following issuance of the
federal injunction, the state court judge overseeing the opt-out
plaintiff’s claim issued an order staying the action “until clarifica-
tion is achieved ... as to the scope, effect and ramifications [of the
district court order] so that the parties and this Court may
understand the practical impact this injunction will have on these
proceedings.”401 The Third Circuit in Diet Drugs II also expressed
concern that the federal district court’s order lacked clarity
regarding the decisions the state trial court retained authority to
make and those that were foreclosed.402
Finally, a vague order might not only create uncertainty for the
state trial court judge, but it might also unduly inhibit the opt-out
plaintiff’s attorney from seeking to offer evidence at trial. In the
absence of a federal order making evidentiary determinations, the
attorney representing the opt-out plaintiff might seek to offer at
trial evidence that would support both plaintiff’s negligence or
defective design claims, and also a claim for punitive damages. If
the plaintiff’s attorney “pushed the envelope,” the defendant’s
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attorney likely would object to the introduction of the evidence, and
the state trial court could sustain the objection or even grant a
mistrial. But the plaintiff’s attorney would not run the risk of a
punitive sanction.403 On the other hand, if the federal court were to
grant a pretrial order proscribing the introduction of vague
categories of evidence, “[t]here [would] be strong pressure on
[plaintiff’s] counsel to steer well clear of the line and possibly forego
offering admissible evidence that [plaintiff] would normally expect
to get before the jury.”404 This pressure could drive a wedge between
plaintiff’s counsel, who might curb her zealousness to avoid being
held in contempt, and her client, whose interests might be served
by more aggressive efforts to offer the evidence at trial.
Recognizing the federal court’s “unquestioned right to effectuate
the restraints of the settlement through an order limiting opt-out
plaintiffs’ conduct in ancillary state proceedings,”405 the Third
Circuit nevertheless concluded:
[T]he power must be exercised in a manner that minimizes
entanglement in the state judge’s ability to supervise judicial
proceedings in his own courtroom. Similarly, the order should be
fashioned in a manner that presumes that the state judge is
capable and willing to enforce that settlement without close and
intrusive supervision by the District Court.406
CONCLUSION
Back-end opt-out rights afford absent class members a delayed
opportunity to remove themselves from a class action lawsuit when
they know the terms of the settlement, when they know how much
they will receive under it, or when they learn that they have been
injured or the extent of their injuries. In some instances, class
members are afforded limited back-end opt-out rights: they are
permitted to exclude themselves from the class action at a later
time, but in exchange for the prolonged flexibility, they give up
something of value, such as the right to sue for punitive damages
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or the right to bring certain claims. These structural innovations
render the right to opt out more meaningful by permitting its
exercise when class members have enough information to make an
informed decision.
This Article has identified several curious complications that may
arise if absent class members exercise limited back-end opt-rights
and choose to bring their claims in state court and the defendant
then asks the federal court that approved the class action settle-
ment to enforce the limits inherent in the opt-out right through
issuance of an injunction. The Article has raised questions regard-
ing the federal court’s power—whether it would have subject matter
jurisdiction to proceed or personal jurisdiction over the absent class
members; federalism—whether the risk of friction that a federal
injunction against a pending state judicial proceeding likely would
cause counsels against issuance of the injunction; and the federal
court’s good judgment—whether equitable and practical concerns
militate against federal intervention to enforce the limits inherent
in back-end opt-out rights.
By identifying these various complications, this Article does not
mean to discourage the use of back-end opt-out rights. To the
contrary, this Article attempts to facilitate the use of these back-
end opt-out rights by suggesting ways to improve the quality of
information afforded to absent class members and to ensure that
both state and federal courts have effective tools to enforce the
limits inherent in some back-end opt-out rights.
Four general conclusions emerge. First, counsel and courts
overseeing class action litigation should seek to ensure that
settlement agreements and notices sent to absent class members
are more explicit about the risks faced by those who preserve
limited opportunities to opt out after the initial, full opt-out period
expires. In particular, settlement agreements and notices should be
clear and explicit about (a) both the claims released and those
retained by class members after the initial, full opt-out period
expires; (b) the restrictions, if any, on the types of damages that
those exercising back-end opt-out rights may seek; and (c) the
extent to which the opportunity to offer evidence that supports
preserved claims but also would support precluded claims or types
of damages may be hampered by the preclusive effect of the release.
Such specific guidance will help absent class members make better
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informed decisions. And such guidance will help whichever court,
federal or state, that may later be called upon to enforce the limits
imposed by the settlement agreement and the back-end opt-out
right.
Second, to ensure that they will have the authority to enforce the
limitations imposed on class members exercising back-end opt-out
rights (should they choose to exercise it), federal district courts
approving class action settlements should (a) expressly retain
jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement or
incorporate the terms of the agreement into their orders of dis-
missal; (b) issue injunctions against the filing of state suits that
present claims covered by the settlement agreement or seek
damages barred by the settlement agreement before any such state
suits are filed; and (c) consider urging the parties, when crafting the
settlement agreement and back-end opt-out form, to include a
waiver of potential objections to the court’s jurisdiction in any
ancillary proceeding brought to enforce the limits built into the
back-end opt-out right.
Third, federal and state courts should cooperate in the enforce-
ment of back-end opt-out rights. Open communication between the
two courts may alleviate the federal court’s concerns that the state
court may not understand the nature of the limits imposed by the
settlement agreement or the critical role that such limits play in the
overall settlement.407 Once such information is communicated—in
a conference call arranged upon notice to, and with participation of,
counsel for all relevant parties—the federal court’s and the liti-
gants’ concerns may be allayed and the federal court may feel
sufficiently comfortable to leave it for the state court to decide the
evidentiary issues that may arise during the state court trial. The
Manual for Complex Litigation contemplates other means of
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coordination between state and federal judges, including “joint
pretrial conferences and hearings at which all involved judges
preside, and parallel orders.”408 Such partnering between the state
and federal courts in the enforcement of settlement agreements
would reduce friction, bolster respect and comity, and minimize the
practical problems that would arise if the federal court were unduly
intrusive.
Finally, in deciding whether to issue an injunction against a
back-end opt-out plaintiff or to enforce an injunction issued before
the filing of the state court action, the federal court should examine
the contacts the back-end opt-out plaintiff has with the state in
which the federal court sits. If the contacts are minimal, the federal
court should consider whether it would be fair to subject a plaintiff
who lacks minimum contacts to coercive or punitive sanctions if she
were to violate the injunction and whether it would be fair to
deprive her of the opportunity to challenge the adequacy of
representation in a convenient forum.
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